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Daily Report

Supplement

East Europe

JPRS-EER-93-024-S
Friday
26 March 1993

East Europe SUPPLEMENT

JPRS-EER-93-024-S

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EC Poll Shows Confidence in Democracy

93P20106A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in
Albanian 25 Feb 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by Muje Bucpapaj and Shpetim Luku: "Albanians Have Confidence in Democracy, the Democratic State, the Market Economy, and Their Future in Europe—Press Conference of the European Community Representatives in Albania"]

[Text] Recently, the European Community conducted a poll in 18 countries in Central and Eastern Europe to determine public opinion on the European Community and on the political and economic reforms undertaken in these countries. The results of this poll are being announced today, at the same time, in all countries.

The poll was organized by a specialized unit of the European Community called "EUROBAROMETRE," which charged the British Gallup Institute with the actual execution of the poll.

More than 18,000 persons were polled. They were selected so as to represent the structure and the geographic distribution of the entire population above the age of 15 in these countries. Some 1,049 people were polled in Albania.

This is the most complete poll carried out so far in Central and Eastern Europe.

Albania is in first place among the 18 countries in its conviction that the country is moving in the right direction (77 percent), in its general confidence in the freely chosen market economy (72 percent) and in the current political system (84 percent), and in its great optimism about the future (71 percent think that the economic situation will improve in the next 12 months). Albania also shows a great readiness to accelerate economic reform (56 percent) and privatization (56 percent), despite the difficulties involved.

On the other hand, the figures are divided in regard to democratization in Albania (44 percent satisfied, 54 percent dissatisfied) while the figures in regard to respect for human rights are less divided (58 percent satisfied and 37 percent dissatisfied).

Albanians do not have much confidence in the media, either television (45 percent have confidence in it and 49 percent do not) or, especially, the press (25 percent have confidence in it and 54 percent do not).

Albanians are aware of the importance of the assistance that the Western countries have given to them (68 percent are satisfied).

As for the European Community, the Albanians are the ones who value it the most (79 percent) and, with a figure

which is much higher than that of any other country (63 percent), they decided their future in the EC (however, the 53-percent dissatisfaction that they expressed toward the EC is the result of its attitude toward the former Yugoslavia). Almost all persons polled (91 percent) were in favor of full membership for Albania in the EC, while maintaining a realistic attitude about when Albania would become a member (56 percent think that it will happen in five or 10 years). Of course, the results of a poll must always be interpreted carefully, especially when it is carried out in a country where the people are not yet familiar with this type of survey. However, the results in Albania clearly show many hopeful tendencies and, compared to those in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, they are among the most encouraging.

[Box, p 1]

- 77 percent of the Albanians expressed their conviction that Albania is traveling on the right road.
- 84 percent of the Albanians have general confidence in the political system chosen.
- 72 percent of the Albanians have general confidence in the market economy.
- 71 percent of the Albanians have confidence that the economic situation will improve during the coming 12 months.
- 84 percent of the Albanians believe that the present regime is better than the previous one.
- 91 percent of the Albanians say that they are in favor of Albania's membership in the EC, with which they link their future.
- Albania is in first place among the 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe which expressed their convictions about the road to democracy and which give a positive evaluation of the road chosen.
- 56 percent of the Albanians are in favor of accelerating economic reforms.
- The EC poll invalidates completely the accusations of conservative communists about the faltering of the reform, the worsening of the economic and political situation in the country, the holding of elections ahead of schedule, and so forth.
- The EC poll indicated a movement of the Albanians toward Europe; toward their future.
- This poll also obligates the EC to continue to provide assistance to Albania and to Albanians in the future.
- This poll gives courage to our democratic state and our democratic government to work with even more determination in the future.

*** Klaus' Reservations to Visegrad Group Detailed**
93CH0435A Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* in German
1 Mar 93 p 8

[Article by Markus Ziener: "Visegrad Coalition Shows Clear Rifts"]

[Text] *It was just last December that the "Visegrad Four"—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic—met in Krakow to sign the charter for the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Area) Free Trade Zone. But already the signs of dissolution within the Eastern European alliance have become impossible to conceal. The coalition of the so-called reform states is deteriorating further, and, to all appearances, more rapidly, each month.*

From the very beginning, Vaclav Klaus, the prime minister of the Czech Republic, has made no secret of his aversion to the coalition established in 1990 in the Hungarian town of Visegrad. The head of the Czech Government is convinced that no alliance consisting of economically weak states can be strong.

Moreover, as prime minister of what he calls a model free market economy state, Klaus would like to maintain a polite distance from Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. He believes that the path towards membership in the European Community, which the establishment of the Visegrad coalition was actually intended to smooth, is one that the Czech Republic would do better to walk alone.

The most recent, and quite surprising, initiative by the Ukraine should justify Prime Minister Klaus's antipathy towards the alliance. At the founding ceremony of the "East Carpathian Euroregion," which was held in the Hungarian town of Debrecen, Foreign Minister Slenko announced that the Ukraine would like to join the Visegrad coalition as soon as possible.

There is no question that the addition of the Ukraine would further weaken the coalition economically. This is quite apart from the fact that in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, very few countries have had any interest in forming another alliance with a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Were the Czechs to move closer to anyone at all, it would likely be the Slovenians. For it is on this former Yugoslav quasi-republic that the economic hopes of the Balkan Peninsula have been pinned.

The EC response to the Visegrad issue has been one of genteel restraint, limited to common cliches. But even these can be eloquent enough. The EC Commission in Brussels has let it be known that it is not its job to play schoolmaster. Of course the EC welcomes the cooperation of these four Eastern European countries, but their full membership in the European Community will not necessarily follow.

The EC Commission took an even firmer stance during the negotiations over the Association Agreement. There

is to be no special arrangement for any individual country, which explains the evident welcome by the EC of the Visegrad coalition. But following the charge by Vaclav Klaus that the alliance had been "artificially created by the West," it was obvious that the EC had relaxed its stance somewhat.

According to an observer, Vaclav Klaus has assumed the role of brakeman where the Visegrad coalition is concerned, similar to that of British prime minister John Major where the EC is concerned. Vaclav Klaus has warned that a CEFTA dirigism could develop, bringing in its wake bureaucracy, but no concrete benefits. And the more these four countries tie themselves to one another formally and institutionally, the more complicated their eventual integration into the EC will be.

Nor was the statement by President Lech Walesa of Poland that, if the four countries do not attain full membership in the EC soon, the Visegrad alliance should be developed into an EC II or a NATO II welcomed with open arms. This would just serve to further cement the existing state of affairs and block the path towards EC membership completely.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Visegrad alliance will be dissolved officially, as it can be useful as a sign of good will toward other nations. But the more the Eastern European countries are forced to isolate themselves from one another and reinforce their borders—as in the wake of the asylum agreement—and the more they look toward the West economically, the less important the Visegrad alliance will become. And as Vaclav Klaus put it, "Now more than ever, the motto among the former communist countries is 'Every man for himself.'"

*** Future Military Expenditures Questioned**

93CH0441A Prague *EKONOM* in Czech 18-24 Feb 93
pp 29-32

[Article by Libuse Bautzova: "Will Military Expenditures Grow?"]

[Text] In the 1993 state budget, 23 billion korunas have been allocated for the defense of the Czech Republic. In contrast to the K37 billion allocated for the same purpose in 1989 for the federation (it is, of course, difficult to separate these expenditures into Czech and Slovak; to simplify, we can think about two-thirds for the Czech Republic) this year's amount is somewhat lower. However, at the present time, when forceful steps toward reform have been taken, when the government has an understandable interest in balancing the state budget, and, moreover, when the political situation in the world is entirely different in comparison with the previous decades, we may ask: Isn't this still too much? How will this money be used?

I am afraid that this article does not have an unequivocal answer to the above questions. As much as some may insist that they can prove that military expenditures of this size are justified, or, on the other hand, prove that

the Army could do with half of it, the reality is different. The fact of the matter is that today's situation in the Army not only does not make any prognosis for the future possible, it does not even give a clear picture of its current management; the Army itself cannot precisely quantify and substantiate its demands. There is nothing to start with, and so far not even a goal has been set toward which to aim.

Terminology

First, to keep things in order, we must make clear precisely what is meant by military expenditures, expenditures for defense, and army expenditures. Simply put, army expenditures are merely a part of the overall expenditures for defense, and they comprise items which the Army actually needs for its existence, including expenditures for training soldiers and purchasing new equipment. Expenditures for defense are comprised of expenditures for the Army in the broader sense, that is, they include expenditures for economic mobilization, railway engineers, civil defense, etc.

The broadest group is represented by military expenditures, which in addition to the expenditures for defense, are comprised of expenditures for special research and development, border guards, and allegedly (information from the Office of the Presidium of the Government) in part the forces under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The statute for military expenditures and their structure is precisely determined by the UN, and since 1988 the Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) has been preparing, according to this methodology, a yearly report on the amount of military expenditures. It is not without interest that in 1990 we were commended for an exemplary preparation of the standardized report. The fact that we are able to equal the NATO countries in the level of reports (which are entered in the UN records) is that much more significant because our army has, especially in the area of budgeting and accounting, quite a few specifics attributable to the former system of planning.

(It is not a good idea to confuse the above mentioned terminology—the staff of the Ministry of Defense do not like it and consider it misleading—even though the reality is such that 90 percent of military expenditures, which are reported for UN purposes, actually represent expenditures for the Army.)

Comparison With the World

If we look at the share of defense expenditures in the total outlays of the Czech Republic state budget, we find that they represent about 6 percent, which in comparison with the data from past years reflects a decline (in 1989 the share of defense expenditures in the CSFR state budget was 8.9 percent).

In 1992 expenditures for the defense of CSFR came to a total of 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product of the republic. In 1990 this was 4.1 percent, and in the current year this share will probably be somewhere around 3

percent. In comparison with some selected NATO countries, our expenditures are somewhat higher, but there is no reason why we should not be in step with West Europe in two or three years. Under the new conditions and in the new political situation, this is a realistic prospect.

Share of Defense Expenditures of Comparable NATO Countries (in percent)

	1990	1991
Belgium	2.4	2.4
Denmark	2.0	2.0
Italy	2.1	2.1
Luxemburg	1.1	1.2
Netherlands	2.7	2.6
Spain	1.8	1.7

Also, the share of professional soldiers and enlisted men in basic service (which represents altogether about 100,000 people) in the total number of able-bodied people in CR is comparable to analogous indicators in West European countries: whereas here this share today is about 2.5 percent, in comparable countries it is in the neighborhood of 2 percent.

Soldiers Without Socks

Here too, as is usual in every other branch of the government and in every other country, army representatives try to request every year roughly Kc5 to 8 billion more than they will finally receive. According to Ministry of Defense spokesmen, the expenditures for this year are at the lowest level at which the armed forces can function at all and manage to keep their equipment combat ready. The low budget naturally means that purchases of new equipment will have to be limited, modernization brought to a halt, and research and development maintenance will become more difficult.

This year only as much will be allocated for the development and modernization programs as is necessary to provide for simple modification of equipment and purchase of spare parts. A rather large amount, approximately Kc9 billion out of the total of Kc23 billion, will go this year for personnel expenses, which comprise not only salaries for permanent employees but also benefits (pensions, etc.)

The fact is that the characteristic feature of the past several years (and this trend continues this year) has been precisely the increase of nominal operating expenditures including personnel expenditures. Whereas 10 to 15 percent of military expenditures was still allocated for the purchase of equipment in 1989, in 1992 this share is a mere 3 percent, and special research and development had to be satisfied with not quite 2 percent. This year the situation will be comparable.

If you were to ask a member of the Ministry of Defense what would happen if the Army were to get only Kc15

billion instead of Kc23 billion, he would most likely answer: "There will be no improvements; we shall keep the old equipment; the soldiers will wear tattered uniforms and go without socks and maybe even go hungry." He would cite the current conditions, the existing accounting method in the Army, the existing number of soldiers, and a not entirely rational structure of the military equipment. The fact of the matter is that the problem is not in the amount of the expenditures but in the Army itself. If the Army were really put into a situation where it would have to reduce its expenditures by, for example, one-third, it would probably resolve the problem differently, and, one must add, more wisely. It would not try to save money by cutting down on socks but would get rid of some of its combat equipment, particularly the most expensive kind.

Accounting

Our army has, at the very least, one enormous peculiarity, and that is the way it does its accounting. Today it is difficult to trace the roots of this, to put it mildly, unusual method, but the fact is that it provides fertile ground for wastefulness. The basis—and understandably also the greatest shortcoming—of the present state of affairs is the fact that beginning with a certain level (in a downward direction) accounting in the Army is not financial accounting but accounting by the piece. One simply counts how many uniforms, shirts, etc. each unit uses; never mind what it costs. There is no motivation, no mechanism that would force anyone to buy and use less expensive things. This is precisely where the legacy of the past is manifest the most: The Army is "supplied with money."

Last year's announcement on receiving bids for supplying field uniforms to the Army was supposed to have been a step toward cost consciousness. Three firms submitted bids. The victor was the one that has been supplying uniforms to the Army in the past (how else). This result, of course, need not be considered a catastrophe; it stands to reason that other enterprises which want to bid for supplying the Army must first find out what in fact it involves. It does not mean that in the next round of bidding another firm, a better, less expensive one could not be the winner.

If we go back to army accounting, we need to keep in mind that the transition to another method will entail considerable difficulties. For the Army to train economists who may have to adapt to double-entry accounting (it is up to the Ministry of Finance what rules it will set for next year), it will require a lot of time and probably a lot of money. Nevertheless, we must begin, if only so that we can continue to adopt foreign models of planning and budgeting.

One more "trifle" is worth mentioning. There are no write-offs in the Army. So far no one has looked into how to calculate depreciation on military equipment. All military installations, of which there are quite a few, also have a *de jure* cost-price value.

Investments—And What To Do About Them

The Army's statements and summaries show, among other things, "investments" as a separate item, the monetary value of which was higher last year than that of purchases of military equipment. It should be noted in this connection that none of the foreign specialists understand our army's concept of investment and non-investment items.

We must first explain what is actually hidden in the concept "investment" in our army. Again simply put, investment is everything that in some way involves land; it could be a parcel of land or a building. This item never includes purchases of tanks, aircraft, etc., even if it involves values in the millions of korunas.

Given the fact that new, in the proper sense of the word, military facilities were probably not built last year, this item most likely covers military housing construction.

Employees of the defense branch do not deny that they have at their disposal a large number of facilities, certainly more than they need in order to function. This overcapacity has been obvious especially since the division of Czechoslovakia, when the greater part of the installations (including airports) of the former federation remained in the Czech Republic. The need to get rid of some installations and equipment had become obvious following some strange practices by the X-TRADE company when it began to engage in commercial activities in the Army in 1991. This activity has come under strict control, and since 31 December 1992 nothing has been allowed to be sold. Further sales will wait until a detailed study is carried out and a clear future for the Czech Army determined.

In any case, it is the duty of the Army to make certain that all sales are sufficiently transparent. After the bad experience from the year before last, it will probably be wiser for someone other than the Army itself to undertake this job. There is no problem, one would think, in using the services of a specialized real estate agency....

PPBS

The economic section of the Ministry of Defense is wrestling today with one of its most difficult problems. It wants to make the entire system of management in the Army open and make military expenditures unambiguous (primarily in the interest of the Army itself). The basis for doing so is the original U.S. method of planning, programming, and budgeting (PPBS-Planning, Programming, Budgeting System), which is also used by all West European countries.

PPBS makes it possible to divide military budget expenditures into operating expenses, necessary for the existence of the army, and expenses for development, which include equipment and modernization, and it also ensures feedback. The budget can be made very specific and thus the use of the money controlled. The Army itself can carry out "redistribution" only in the category

of operating resources, the total amount of which is strictly determined by certain mandatory standards. An important role in the allocation of money for developmental programs must be assumed by the parliament. It approves all expenditures, not only in their total amount but also now according to the individual program goals which are to be attained within a certain period of time. The planning horizon is as much as 12 years. Strategic goals are determined for the Army (not by the Army), and certain steps within the program, aimed at reaching these goals, will be developed, including their financing. Each year the objectives will be worked out in detail and money released for the individual approved programs. The basic principle is that money from one "purse" cannot be transferred to the other purse.

So far, no one in the Czech Army doubts that this new system will be successfully introduced, that the budget for 1994 will be closer to the new system, and that at the same time a more long-range outlook will be under consideration. However, we cannot rely too much on getting assistance from abroad, where PPBS has been in use for years. The current talks with specialists from FRG, the United States, Great Britain, France, and other countries show that their armies are already, so to speak, somewhere else. Their methods and procedures are fully in place and functioning, and nobody remembers how PPBS was introduced.

The government thinks that it is possible today to define the basic priorities, quantify them economically, and determine the amount of necessary operating expenditures, etc. But the precondition for this, of course, will be to first clarify our military doctrine and on its basis plan the new concept of the Czech Army.

No Concept Yet

The conception of what the future Army of the Czech Republic should look like, and what in fact its mission should be, is evolving. Even though the current geopolitical situation has remained more or less unchanged for the past three years (if we do not count the division of CSFR), almost nothing has changed in the defense branch, and many of the past months have been taken up merely with idle waiting. That makes the current state of affairs even more serious, and a decisive word should be spoken as soon as possible.

Since the new year, the so-called planning group of the Ministry of Defense (composed of staff members of the defense branch and answerable to the minister) has been at work. Its task is to prepare doctrine by the end of April a study whose content should be a strategic guideline and a definition of economic possibilities on the basis of a newly defined military. According to the new concept of the Army, we should begin to build an army that would correspond to our needs as well as our possibilities. In the second quarter, the concept should be debated and approved (or rejected, as the case may be) by the parliament.

Individual members of the planning group have the possibility to put together expert working teams, whose members should be primarily civilians (deputies, government officials, representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.). The participation of nonmilitary persons in the creation of a new military order is more than essential, but it is possible that even this method will not be a sufficient guarantee that a distorted "army" view of the entire situation will not prevail. Generally, the greatest problem for military experts is considered to be the fact that the enemy is not precisely defined (it can be deduced that none exists). Military doctrine therefore must be constructed in such a way that it covers "general danger from any direction."

Military and Civilian

Although Minister Antonin Baudys recently stated that military expenditures must be increased, such an eventuality is not very likely. At the very least, an increase in expenditures is not absolutely essential. Our objective should be to create an army that is small but as efficient as possible, to cut back ineffective activities and useless expenditures, and arrive at a share of defense expenditures that is under 3 percent. It will probably be necessary to take out some activities that are not immediately connected with the Army (civil defense, expenditures for maintaining production capabilities in some enterprises, specialized research and development, etc.), and create a certain sector under civilian management, which will take some burden off the command level in the army. In short, a soldier should not be doing the housekeeping.

The army should also be rid of all commercial activity. The fact is, the idea that the Army could be self-supporting is wrong. Even if we disregard the basic fact that the Army has a totally different purpose than to earn money, we still have another reality which today is not being disregarded to the west of our borders: The Army, by engaging in business deprives the civilian sector of work and profits that flow from that work. Let the army allow others to earn money!

In separating military and civilian activities we can use one of the foreign models. A strict separation of the economic (financial) and logistic (supply) parts from the purely military parts is characteristic, for example, of the German Bundeswehr where both of these activities are handled by civilian agencies. In contrast to the German method, the U.S. system is a mixed system, which means that logistics are separate and the economic activities are "permeated" by the military. We can probably take the clearly defined German model as our goal, although it will be necessary to proceed gradually through the mixed one first.

Professionalizing the Army

One of the most basic questions which has to be answered concerns making the Army professional. The condition for making the correct decision, whether to

have a professional army or not, and above all how large and when, is, among other things, to express in numbers the cost of the training and "operating costs" for enlisted men in basic service, and the cost needed for the functioning of a certain number of professional soldiers. For some facts a mere logical estimate is enough. It is, for example, certain that to train one soldier (professional) once every five years as a tank driver will be more efficient and cheaper than to train new ones (in basic service) every year. Therefore, a quick and reasonable alternative presents itself: Choose the army unit that is the most costly to train and immediately professionalize it with the help of existing professional soldiers.

Unfortunately, this simple solution comes up against a problem. The present structure and quality of professional soldiers (their total is about 35,000) is not what one would expect of a professional army. After the departure of many, especially younger and more able, members of the armed forces to the civilian sector (where they mostly, and rightly, expect to put their skills to better use and earn more), our army "professionals" today are people of a more advanced age who could be trained, as tank drivers for example, only with considerable difficulty. Nor can a great increase in the ranks of the professional army be expected in the near future, even if it is likely that an attempt to achieve that will be made in the second half of this year. A change could occur only if unemployment rises sharply or the salaries in the military sector increase considerably. However, neither one of these eventualities can be counted upon.

Although today the planning commission is convinced that the ideal is as broadly professional an army as possible, other alternatives also come under consideration. Whereas in our circumstance a fully professional army would represent an estimated 30,000-40,000 professional soldiers under a temporary contract (five, possibly three years), a mixed type of army would mean approximately 60-70 percent professionals and 30-40 percent enlisted men in basic service. Our army will certainly adopt a certain degree of professionalization, but most likely this will be done at a slower pace. In any case, this transition will result in higher expenditures in the initial phase.

Equipment

The new concept will also require a re-evaluation of the present state and structure of military equipment; it will have to be determined on the basis of the newly defined military doctrine with what and within what time frame the Czech armed forces will be equipped. The present Soviet-type equipment is gradually wearing out. But to wait, for example, 10 years and then replace the old equipment with new equipment all at once would obviously not be tolerable. Rearming must also begin as soon as possible.

In doing that, it is not absolutely necessary to look only to the West. If we are able to procure some types of military equipment of a European standard in the Czech Republic (this concerns mainly light weaponry, but there also may be a future for today's training Albatrosses which, after rearming, could be used as light fighter planes), it would be illogical to look for suppliers abroad. On the contrary, we can look for foreign partners with whom to cooperate or as buyers of our production, which could support domestic manufacturing. The fact of the matter is that even in arms production it holds true that if we do not undertake the production of certain articles ourselves, another producer will be found, regardless of moral criteria. That we have a chance to succeed is obvious: There are already several advance design programs which give us the prerequisite for future penetration of Western markets.

Military doctrine, strategic guidelines for the development of the armed forces, professionalization and cooperation with the civilian sector, conversion, production of military equipment and political and economic aspects which cannot be separated are accumulated problems for which the solutions will require, among other things, overcoming the disapprobation of many who have a stake in the matter. But the sooner the radical step is taken, of course, the lower the resulting expenditures will be and the entire process simpler, without regard to whether (or, as the case may be, when) we become members of NATO.

*** Import, Export Licensing Expected To Expand**

93EP0199B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Market Supplement) in Polish 22 Feb 93 p 1

[Article by Danuta Walewska: "The Ever-Longer Arm of the State"]

[Text] Andrzej Arendarski, minister of foreign economic cooperation, admits that his liberal soul is torn. On the one hand he believes in the market and its ability to control supply and demand. On the other hand, it is he who signs the orders sanctioning export and import restrictions. His subordinates admit that there will be more of these restrictions in 1993 than last year.

It is the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation (MWGzZ) that determines which exporter can export or import—what, how much, and where. The first barrier to cross to be able to do business is a small one. In order to export or import goods subject to licensing or quotas he must have permission to conduct economic activity. Licenses for exporting and importing weapons, radioactive materials and military equipment are granted by MWGzZ-CZINZ [expansion unknown].

There are three types of quotas:

- Domestic export (covering commodities on which agreements restricting export have been signed—fibers, textiles, and clothing sold to the EC, the United States, Canada and Norway), and those relating to sheep exported to the EC;
- Domestic import—e.g., alcohol, cigarettes, diesel oil, and gasoline. In addition, permission to import these must goods must also be obtained.
- Customs duties—establishing preferential zero rates—for the import of parts for industrial assembly of automobiles on the basis of a foreign producer's license.
- In addition, the import by 30 June 1993 of an additional 800,000 tons of wheat; 300 tons of rye; 900,000 tons of barley; 100,000 tons of oats, and for the import of automobiles produced in the EC (26,250 passenger cars without catalytic convertors, 5,500 with catalytic convertors, 110 trucks), and electronic assembly parts.

A quota is also being prepared to establish preferential, but not zero, duty rates on paper and fuels imported from the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries.

There are also commodities whose import into Poland is totally restricted and some commodities that are restricted by time and quantity. For example, the following cannot be brought into Poland:

- vodka and pure spirits;
- two-cycle engines, automobiles with two-cycle engines, automobile chassis equipped with two-cycle engines;
- automobiles, their chassis and bodies older than 10 years, and bodies older than six years.

The following cannot be taken out of Poland:

- live geese and goose eggs (to 31 March 1993),
- protein feeds and oats (to 30 June 1993).

Temporary restrictions have been placed on several commodities. For imports these include:

- dairy products,
- beer,
- wine,
- natural gas.

For exports these include:

- dairy products,
- pure alcohol,
- vodka,
- liquors and other alcoholic beverages,
- cigars,
- diesel oil,
- gasoline.

For a certain time the export of coal was also restricted, and the export of grains is still being restricted until it is apparent that the effects of the drought have been overcome.

There is also a ban on trade with some countries. Many countries now have trade restrictions with Iraq; in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, trade is banned with the exception of medicines and food products, and products satisfying indispensable humanitarian needs.

The undersecretary of state in MWGzZ, Andrzej Kisielewicz, told RZECZPOSPOLITA that the allocation of quotas in 1993 is and will be decided in consultation with the involved importers, and more often in conformity with their suggestions. Kisielewicz described the contacts with them as being of a "working" nature. If misunderstandings occur, as did recently with the importers of parts for the production of computers, for example, they may be the result, according to the ministry, of an understandable impatience on the part of this group.

Minister Kisielewicz believes that in this case it was important that the quotas for the import of parts be obtained exclusively by those importers who produce computers, and not those who sell them in the bazaars.

In our present market situation quotas are essential. Anyway, speaking candidly, there is no country in which only the "invisible hand of the market" rules. Quotas serve to protect the market or are an expression of compromise.

It is also in the interest of the state treasury to eliminate the quota system. We must remember that quotas are established only within the boundaries of a certain value, and because permission to import is always tied to this value, the state has an additional ability to control the market.

This is also important when quotas are combined with a suspension of customs duties. This, then, is state interference, but this is assumed to be an instrument of assistance to those who produce a great deal and at the same time invest. Quotas are an instrument of economic policy, which is selected according to needs. Quota allocations and their amounts are defined for one-year periods.

"If we compare last year's quotas with this year's," said Minister Kisielewicz, "we must admit that there are more of them in 1993." The pressure of various occupational groups, mostly the farmers who demanded restrictions in foreign trade, has been successful. For example, a quota on parts used for assembling automobiles in Poland, particularly one free of duties, may serve as an incentive for investment.

* NBP President Discusses 1993 Money Supply

93EP0199A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Economy and Market Supplement) in Polish 27-28 Feb 93 p IV

[Article by P.J.: "KIR, SYBIR, and ELIKSIR"]

[Text] The first day of the "Business" Fair in Bydgoszcz took place in something of a closed-door atmosphere. A few dozen people showed up at the seminar devoted to banks. This limited attendance was particularly surprising because the vice president of the National Bank of Poland (NBP), Professor Witold Kozinski, was to deliver a paper of interest to businessmen, entitled "NBP Policy in 1993 With Particular Consideration Given to the Development of Entrepreneurship." Presumably the reason for the low interest was the poor date chosen to hold the fair.

President Kozinski's paper really did not fully correspond to its title. The speech basically consisted of a discussion of the basis of NBP policy, which, on the one hand is supposed to revitalize the economy, and on the other hand reduce inflation. That is why NBP has to maintain constant control over the flow of money into the market. The basic problem in the Polish economy is high prices. According to the president, these prices have tripled since the end of the war. Enterprises are not able to rationalize their costs and every additional inflow of money into the economy, beyond that established in the budgetary law, causes a large jump in prices.

The statement that the hard money policy conducted during 1990-92 at the time of Prime Minister Balcerowicz's economic reforms was too radical for the economy was a sure indicator to the businessmen of how the president looks at the bank's credit policy. When an enterprise is rebuilding itself it should have money to use. But on the other hand, president Kozinski said there is no question as to whether money should be easy or hard to get. Access to money always has to be difficult. The problem is to establish a certain level for this difficulty. At present the budget deficit has a large effect on the interest rate on credit, and specifically on the interest rate on the certificates which the Ministry of

Finance is issuing to cover it. Although it is lower than the interest rate on credit, investing in them is not without risk. For banks that use these credits to make up 30 percent of their credit portfolios, this is very important.

In talking about the recent reduction in the interest rate, the NBP vice president said that the central bank was thus able to keep up with the decisions of the banks. But this was not an easy decision because it could have brought forth other consequences. Consideration was given to the possibility of a sudden increase in the street (counter) exchange rate of the dollar, the result of which could have even forced a decision to devalue the zloty.

Jan Solarz, adviser to the NBP president, described the practical problems of coordinating the Polish banking system. According to him, if the Polish banks are to survive, they must adapt themselves to EC requirements. In EC countries the banks offer a much broader range of services than the Polish banks. This means, that in applying the rule of equal benefits, the foreign bankers will be able to offer them in Poland, thus creating competition for Polish banks. Also, from the standpoint of fees, the Polish banks lose to the foreign banks. It is enough to say that the average profitability of banks in the EC countries is several percent.

Artur Strozynski, vice president of the National Clearing House (KIR), described the successive phases of the development of KIR. During the first phase, a paper clearing will be set up—a SYBIR system. In September of this year an electronic system, ELIKSIR, should become operational. At the moment a courier system delivers documents between branches. It takes one day to send documents through this system. Only 4 percent of the deliveries are en route for a longer period of time.

* Interview With UOP Chief Konieczny

93EP0196A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 8, 21 Feb 93 pp 1, 5-6

[Interview with Jerzy Konieczny, chief of the Office of State Protection (UOP), by Witold Beres; place and date not given: "The UOP Knows, but Will Not Say"]

[Text]

In the Past

[Beres] You are a professor of law with quite impressive academic achievements; you are a criminologist, a chemist, and an opera lover—and suddenly you become a "spy hunter." How did this happen? A lust for power?

[Konieczny] As for music—fortunately, I have not always been the UOP chief. My father was a musician, and music is my hobby; these days I still go to the opera.

As for power: no, absolutely not. The majority of my professional life is related to the Silesian University and the criminology department there. Because I established the Club of Catholic Intellectuals in Katowice in the fall of 1980, I was known...

[Beres] In, let's say, underground circles...

[Konieczny] Let's say that... This, together with my police studies, was the reason that when, in the spring of 1990, the governor was looking for a chief of the UOP office then being formed, he came to me. I could not refuse because it was a serious matter. Also, for many years I had participated in murder cases as a court expert and was always somehow close to operational work. For me this was an opportunity to do something practical in my field; for an academic, this is not a small thing. I went on a half-year (now extended) leave, figuring that when I finished my assignment I would be able to go back to my work at the University.

But then Andrzej Mielczanowski invited me to Rakowiecka Street. There was no discussion; he is not a person who can be refused. For thirteen months I worked as his deputy, then I worked in the National Security Office for some time, to come back, in the middle of last year, as the chief of UOP.

[Beres] Let's talk about the criminology issue. You are the coauthor of a book on the history of criminology and police in Poland. Aren't you tempted to figure out some unsolved criminal puzzle, such as the famous Gorgonowa case? Who killed her?

[Konieczny] I think I have probably read everything ever written about that, and I have a solution. One must take a pendulum and see which way it swings.

[Beres] There are also newer cases, involving politics. To what extent UOP should try to solve them?

[Konieczny] The load of current cases is so great that we do not have time. Of course, we serve the police, courts, and prosecutors but only by giving them access to archives.

[Beres] I was thinking more of cases that only the UOP could verify, such as the case of Lt. Col. Kuklinski. Is there anything which can be added to this case?

[Konieczny] Undoubtedly, many elements of the Kuklinski case await explanation. I am not talking about an ethical dispute, because I do not want to get into this. But I have some suggestive evidence that our knowledge in this case is not complete. Will we ever find out the truth? I doubt it.

[Beres] But there are many more cases of agents and people convicted of working for Western agencies. What do you think about that?

[Konieczny] This is essentially a question about the continuity of Poland; one's specific conclusion depends upon the epistemological position one takes.

[Beres] Well, then, to be specific: A person who worked for the West comes to you and says: "I did not work against Poland—I fought with the Empire of Evil," or whatever he will call it. Then what?

[Konieczny] Every secret service has well-developed procedures, called offering procedures. However, the only thing one can say about them is that they require deep conspiracy.

[Beres] And if the agent is already exposed, and simply wants to come back to Poland as a rewarded citizen, or at least with a cleared name?

[Konieczny] This is not my business. For that, there is the law.

We Do It To Them, They Do It To Us

[Beres] Some people accuse the UOP of being under the influence of the CIA; they give the example of the different views in the Kuklinski case.

[Konieczny] No, that's absurd. There was no loss of independence. But it is true that the UOP has been placed in a kind of security pact—cooperation with Western services. This is a great accomplishment by Minister Mielczanowski. Of course, particular areas of interest are sometimes wider, sometimes narrower. It is very valuable, though one cannot see it from the outside, and that is why we have many bilateral contacts.

[Beres] In one interview, you said that counterespionage actions are more important for the UOP. What is your attitude toward economical espionage?

[Konieczny] Positive.

[Beres] Don't you think that it can damage the image of Poland in the world?

[Konieczny] What will damage the picture of Poland?

[Beres] Economic espionage.

[Konieczny] What espionage?

[Beres] For example, the theft of technology.

[Konieczny] What are you talking about—what theft?

[Beres] If I had the evidence I would not ask you.

[Konieczny] Ah, these are only your speculations...

[Beres] Well, let us come back to counterespionage. Since 1990 information on three captured agents of foreign secret services has been leaked to the press. The activities of foreign secret services are probably more numerous than those numbers.

[Konieczny] You must be joking. You yourself said this was "leaked to the press."

[Beres] Let me put it another way. Two of those who were "leaked" worked for German espionage. It is also known that we are a hot battlefield for Germany; German espionage must be directed at Poland. And you are talking about cooperation with Western—including German—secret services. Something is not right.

[Konieczny] I understand that it can seem funny, but the practice is simple. We meet, for example, with the representatives of the BND [German Federal Intelligence Service], and we discuss the matter of amphetamine smuggling. The meeting is finished, and we go our way. That's it.

[Beres] Is the theory of decreased interest on the part of secret services of the former Soviet Union, because of the crisis there, probable?

[Konieczny] I would say this: If I were the Russians, what is happening here would not be insignificant to me. Therefore, their interest in Poland—politically, economically, and otherwise—is great.

[Beres] The political opposition connected with former Prime Minister Olszewski talk about the very specific danger of Russian infiltration in Poland. This supposedly comes from the connections with the secret services and Polish former Communist Party groups. Can you support this theory?

[Konieczny] I cannot say anything about specific danger, but perhaps such danger exists. However, the reality of such a situation will be influenced above all by the situation in our country: integration, economic and democratic reforms, etc.

Sniffing Out the Communist Conspiracy?

[Beres] I am far from the conspiracy theories of Mr. Macierewicz, but when I hear about the smuggling of arms, narcotics, cars, and radioactive materials, and finally that the criminal groups include people from the former Ministry of Internal Affairs or the establishment, I start speculating—maybe Macierewicz is right.

[Konieczny] Minister Macierewicz is not right. It is a mistake to treat people from the so-called nomenklatura or even the Security Service as a united block. Denying that those people are patriotic also irritates me. I know that their attitude toward the system had various motives, ranging from cynical to fatalism—according to which communist Poland was going to be eternal, and therefore it was important to defend it. Today I can see that patriotic motivation in UOP and the police is very high. Also, one must respect the willingness of vindication.

All the more, then, the news of decommunization and collective blacklisting embitters people. I do not want to go into how this disturbs our work and how unwise it is to create more groups of unsatisfied people in Poland.

But while I reject the conspiracy theory, I can see that people from the old system participate in many of those scandals. This is related to two questions. The first is that when we started to form the new system, we did not foresee many problems. For example, we did not foresee the scale of organized or financial crime, the collapse of the Soviet Union, etc. Second, the people of whom we speak belonged to more mobile social groups, however

one evaluates this. They knew the techniques of setting up deals and the techniques of making contacts; they knew the economic mechanisms, so the emergence of some social fringes of a new type right there does not surprise me. This is also true for former officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I do not have any doubt that the majority of them are loyal, but one has to consider that besides the regular agents, thousands of people had some police training. A desire to use this knowledge against the law can occur.

[Beres] An unpopular question: When I watch "The Dogs," I know that it is only a movie, but I wonder if some qualified specialists were removed from service too hastily?

[Konieczny] I also saw that movie. Maybe some experienced people left, but this is a difficult matter. I think that only history can evaluate this calmly.

[Beres] The nomenklatura reminds me of another thing—the attempt, provoked by German journalists, to buy uranium from a group including a vice minister from the communist era. At the beginning, you spoke rather obscurely, nothing had really happened, there was only a few minutes of conversation—in short, dust in the wind. Then our TV showed this film made with a hidden camera. It looked like it was from a Forsyth movie: tens, hundreds of kilograms of radioactive materials smuggled from the former Soviet Union—millions of dollars, etc.

There are three possibilities. The first is that the UOP did not know anything and the agency is so hopeless that it did not even see the German version of the program (quite unlikely). Secondly, it could have been a propaganda mistake. Thirdly, it could have been intentional disinformation. Which of these three versions is closest to the truth?

[Konieczny] First of all, it is still too early to decide anything in this case, or to reveal details—especially since some arrests have been made and the case is still going on.

[Beres] Supposedly, there is no law on this. One can get a few years' suspended sentence for transport of radioactive materials without proper security. Secured transport but without approval of the right department would be just a misdemeanor.

[Konieczny] That is something else. However, if you listened carefully to what I said in front of the Sejm committee and then for the TV cameras, you would have noticed that indeed, my statement was full of conditional clauses, but everything I said was true. I agree, however, that my statement made an impression. I can even say that this impression was intentional. I got into some hot water for this and was scolded, but this is the beauty of my job. Notice, please, that the Sejm committee did not raise any objections, and I was not summoned a second time. But of course, I could stand before the committee any time, if only the doors will be closed to unnecessary persons.

What Are the Special Services for?

[Beres] I understand that operations must be more important than public opinion, but this opinion is important. If we hear every other day that German journalists have found an irradiated Pole who has transported radioactive materials across the entire country, or it turns out that someone wanted to sell cutters to Yugoslavia, or that somebody else smuggled arms, and that a former vice minister in a hotel room offered one hundred kilograms of uranium for production of a nuclear bomb, the impression that the UOP is not in control of the situation will result. In this way, trust in the efficiency of the Polish special services decreases, and this is one step away from mistrust in the state.

[Konieczny] It is a good point. However, I do not agree that trust in the UOP is decreasing. But the journalists must criticize, and this is good.

It is worth mentioning that in countries which already have strong democracies, such problems are not rare. Since we have mentioned Germany—recently they had scandals that could not even compare with ours: illegal sales of tanks, corruption among high officials, mafia connections. Also, I would not want the trouble that the director of the FBI has.

[Beres] One can hardly take comfort from others' misfortunes.

[Konieczny] Easy. One has to remember why we formed the UOP, and that back then the attitude toward us was extremely optimistic. Today people expect more from us, while often it is simply not our area of work. When a convoy of trucks, protected by people armed with weapons (with permits) crosses the border and then disappears a few kilometers from Cieszyn, this is also a case for customs. Financial crimes belong to the treasury offices. Illegal trade of arms belongs to the army information bureau.

[Beres] But the publicity goes to the UOP.

[Konieczny] This is why I do not get upset, and I am trying to do as much as I can. For example, the former Fifth (industry) Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had quite a large team in headquarters, plus many people in each of the 49 provinces. Today analogous tasks—we know the importance of defensive industrial counterespionage are performed by ... how many persons?

[Beres] OK, how many?

[Konieczny] It is better to not even mention the numbers. One can continue the analogy for ever. Several dozen people in one department in an office, and there are 14 provincial offices. This means that in many provinces we do not exist as an institution. Here my power ends.

The level of security in the state is regulated by the politicians. If the politicians decided that it was more

important to eliminate drug dealers in a short time than to invest in education, it would be possible to do so. But things do not work this way; our finances are limited. This should explain the situation.

This is why I laugh when some journalists or an official says that they are wiretapped. We don't do this.

[Beres] Only because you don't have the funds?

[Konieczny] No. Even if we wanted to do this it would be difficult.

[Beres] Don't you sometimes miss spectacular successes? Even when you get a Russian spy this is because he came to you himself.

[Konieczny] The perfect situation, my dream, would be like this: The bureau works perfectly (I do not say that this is the current situation), and nobody hears about its actions.

What can I say? We certainly carry out informational activities. I'm even ready to say that I always answered the questions of the government or of persons who have the right to ask us questions. It also seems to me that our operational orientation is good and we can point out the dangers in various areas of the life of the state. Maybe it is my mistake to be discreet in cases that reach their conclusion in the courts. If you ask about these cases, there are many of them.

There is one more reason why we do not want publicity. If there is but a slight change in accent in the openness of our work, rumors erupt about spies, scandals, or some political intrigue, etc.

If someone is upset that it wasn't us who recorded the film with the hidden camera in the hotel room, we have to ask: Does this mean that we want wiretapping in every hotel, as with the former Security Service, to control most private correspondence? Is this what we want?

Purification

[Beres] Again, I am going to throw stones at the UOP house. Did you read that anonymous book *Spies Are Among Us*?

[Konieczny] I have heard something about it.

[Beres] I am sure you have. What do you think?

[Konieczny] These are materials that are suspected of violating state secrets. The case is being investigated by the prosecutor.

[Beres] I think there is no doubt about that. However, I would like to know who is the author of this book.

[Konieczny] We are taking certain steps as part of the action performed by the prosecutor.

[Beres] I don't believe it. In the book there are quoted documents which indicate that either they were taken from the UOP, or somebody has or had free access to

this information. In a word, this is proof that there is a leak in the UOP. This is highly disturbing, and I would like to know if the UOP knows at all who is the author?

[Konieczny] Here I have to invoke procedural secrecy.

[Beres] And what was your attitude toward purification?

[Konieczny] Negative.

[Beres] And today, when the milk has been spilled?

[Konieczny] Even more negative, because all the bad premonitions before Macierewicz's action are proven before our eyes.

[Beres] The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the UOP, on the pretext of secrecy and the lack of a purification law, have consistently refused to check their archival materials in regards to various accusations about agents. Why then, did both agencies take part in the Kaczynski-Wachowski conflict, denying Kaczynski's accusations that Wachowski was an agent?

[Konieczny] I want to emphasize that we did not verify an accusation about whether someone was an agent, but checked our files to see whether a certain person was an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, participated in such and such a course at such and such a time. This is one of our duties. We did not violate our code in any way. Anyway, the case was conducted by the ministry leadership, and the UOP was only the executor.

[Beres] Two of seven purification proposals remain in the Sejm. Do you think purification can be arranged so that it can be completed somehow without harming the state?

[Konieczny] In my opinion, the only goal should be to come up with a system of recruitment for state administrative positions, and therefore to come up with a system of some sort of verification.

[Beres] Would it be dangerous for the state if some high position was filled with a secret agent of the Security Service?

[Konieczny] One cannot put it this way. The greatest weakness in the purification attempts so far has been the dichotomization of the word "agent"—the theory that people can be divided into agents and nonagents. This is deeply wrong. Knowing the real circumstances of secret service work, I must say that we have here a very complicated matter, from extreme cases to some kind of Wallenrodism.

One can say that an agent is an agent and that's that. But such a simplification is an argument against the second important motive of purification: that justice must be done. If we use the files of the Secret Service, without mentioning that they are incomplete, one can have a thousand reservations as to their reliability. There is a real danger of deliberately falsified records. Therefore, all the simple solutions can be questioned.

[Beres] But lack of simple solutions does not mean that we cannot do anything about it. It would seem to me that if somebody has a high position in political life, and that that person was simply an informer, and it can be proved, then maybe this should be revealed, or he should be forced to leave.

[Konieczny] Yes, but "informer" is a strong word, and I doubt that even the best documents can prove it.

As an example, one person was put on the list of agents without his or her knowledge because an acquaintance of that person was a full-time Secret Service worker who wrote down this person's opinions and information. Another example is the scientist who wanted to travel to the West and agreed to cooperate and brought back entirely legal copies of papers presented at various conferences. It is not very appealing, but was he really an agent?

The Model of a Virtuous UOP Worker

[Beres] Last year several police officers were fired. Were there any cases like this in the UOP?

[Konieczny] Yes, but not many. Since the beginning of the UOP maybe ten of them, but one must remember that there are many more policemen than there are UOP employees. We also work in a field where the temptations are lesser. It is true that I watch with alarm as we are given more and more economic cases, while by law we do not have to do such things. If we were to get deeper into this area, I think that corruption could occur.

[Beres] Can the concept of a controlled purchase increase corruption among UOP workers?

[Konieczny] I don't think so, because according to our plans the control of such operations would be very strict, comparable with current principles regarding the use of operational techniques, for which two constitutional ministers must give their permission.

[Beres] But in the case of Monika Kern's running away from home, it turned out that telephones can be wiretapped even though the importance of the case did not require it. How is it, then, with that security?

[Konieczny] Control of telephone conversations or correspondence during preparatory procedures is one thing, the same thing during the investigation stage is something else. And besides... no, never mind.

[Beres] Yes?

[Konieczny] No, I won't say.

[Beres] Do UOP employees have shooting training? What results do they have?

[Konieczny] We have the right to use special equipment. I support sports, including shooting, but I do not have the exact data. The use of arms is a spectacular failure of counterespionage. Fortunately, as far as I know, counterespionage has not shot at anyone even once.

[Beres] And do you use the shooting range?

[Konieczny] Next question, please.

[Beres] You are one of the founders of the Catholic Intellectuals Club in Katowice. Your predecessor in the UOP, as well as his boss in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, talked about filling the department with Christian values. How are you going to fill the UOP office with Christian values?

[Konieczny] Did they say this?

[Beres] Yes, they did.

[Konieczny] Well, my answer will be short: Give to God what belongs to God, and give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar.

[Beres] Thank you very much for the interview.

Melescanu on Foreign Policy Issues

93BA0573A Bucharest *EUROPA* in Romanian
12-19 Jan 93 pp 3, 11

[Interview with Theodor Melescanu, minister of foreign affairs, by Floriana Jucan; place and date not given: "It Is Important for Us To Promote a National Policy in Foreign Policy, Not the Policy of a Specific Party"]

[Text] [Jucan] Did you decide to start from scratch or are you continuing the foreign policy line laid down by your predecessor?

[Melescanu] I do not think anyone starts from scratch. There is a certain degree of continuity determined by some generally valid geopolitical conditions. If you want a very short answer, it is a case of change within continuity. That is what I would call my mandate.

[Jucan] In your opinion, is politics at the foundation of economics or is economics at the foundation of politics?

[Melescanu] Although I have been accused by Mr. Cervenii of handling dialectics diabolically, I realize this is a question of dialectics in which I would have a hard time expressing myself. I think one is a function of the other. I will give you the answer to the question of what comes first, the chicken or the egg, in the next interview.

[Jucan] The big powers have sometimes been associated with leading the fate of other nations. How do you feel about this matter?

[Melescanu] I think the bigger a country is the more likely it is to believe it has a Messianic destiny and thinks it has the duty to aid others to know the truth. Undoubtedly the big countries will continue to be concerned with having as many countries as possible follow their example. What is different now is that the model is a singular one. Whereas before the big and very big countries were split into two big structures—two big economic-political models—they no longer exist. The whole world is following the same system. Even China, if we take it as an example, while ideologically remaining closer to a leftist policy, is moving very strongly and successfully toward a market economy system. I think the tendency to point out the road to the truth to others, which is a tendency demonstrated by the big countries, will continue.

[Jucan] But they do not always point the way to the truth. For example, during the Gulf war if you had been foreign minister would you have maintained the same view? It is very unlikely you would say no, so as to avoid repudiating your predecessor.

[Melescanu] No, generally I can express some of my own opinions in today's situation. But this does not mean that if I had been in a similar situation one or two years ago I would have given the same answer. I want to tell you one thing: Our position in the Gulf or now in Yugoslavia, to draw a parallel, is not due to a policy laid down but simply an application of the decisions of the

Security Council. Our policy toward Iraq or Serbia was not decided based on factors not within our purview; we do not have a bilateral relationship. Our policy results from being a member of the United Nations. I do not think that either my predecessor or I have very much freedom in deciding Romania's policy when an international decisionmaking organization exists.

[Jucan] But as we see both the war and its consequences did not have the best effects for us.

[Melescanu] Undoubtedly Romania is one of the victims of this policy; it is a country which has paid a very high price on the material level in order to respect these decisions. The conclusion I draw is not necessarily that we have made a mistake; we must go along with certain international legal principles being created and we must seek material resources much more steadfastly so we have more to show for it than losses and the glory that comes with having respected a decision. We have to combine the two things.

[Jucan] I want to ask you what side we should be on during a conflict: on the side of those who are more likely to win or of those who are our friends?

[Melescanu] In a conflict we must be on the side of the law. Of course, policy must be based on national interests but I personally would be tempted to go with international legal principles... and it would be good for these principles to hold. There is no ethics in politics but I still prefer to be on the side of law.

[Jucan] And everything differs from case to case.

[Melescanu] Generally I think that we must have more faith; I know that we and others are concerned with what is happening but I think a certain revolution took place in Europe which would entitle us to pay greater attention to collective judgment. I think there is a tendency in international organs today to make good judgments, a tendency which the majority shares.

[Jucan] What is the greatest uncertainty facing Romania's foreign policy today?

[Melescanu] I think the greatest uncertainty is connected with the environment in which we will develop in the future, that is, the geopolitical developments which will take place in the part of the world we, too, inhabit. For this reason, without trying to excuse myself, I think it is very hard for us to establish some very precise, long-term foreign policy goals quickly. I think we will have to opt for some medium-term tactical goals. The big options must continue to be open because they will be finalized depending on what happens to the east in the former USSR and depending on what happens in the West—and here I am referring to the Common Market and Western Europe in general—because, strange as it may seem, even here there are some uncertainties.

[Jucan] We have the example of Maastricht!

[Melescanu] Exactly and, at the same time, depending on what happens southwest of us and here I am referring to the Balkans, which is an extremely turbulent zone. That is, using a popular expression, with regard to foreign policy I would not put all my eggs into one basket.

[Jucan] Where do you think we have enemies? If you could answer that.

[Melescanu] I can. I think a basic change has occurred. I do not think there are countries conducting a policy hostile to Romania. I think we have internal enemies within our own society, who are our enemies as well as the enemies of others. One of these is intolerance, the tendency many times to seek new ideological bases to differentiate between states; the danger that Romania remains a second-rate partner in a first-class Europe.

A military threat, a deliberate policy of hostility to Romania on the part of some countries backed by military resources, as was the case in the past, seems to me ruled out.

The dangers still are economic ones connected with nationalism, division, and extremist tendencies. There are domestic and foreign enemies.... If you look around you will see that some countries have reached a paroxysm—which is the case with Yugoslavia. Others are very, very close to that—I am thinking of Hungary, where there are extremist manifestations, which sometimes are very harsh. In Germany there is a certain amount of intolerance. Then there are the ideological-political differences between the countries that were republics of the former USSR. That's about how I see the dangers; so, not in the very structured and personal sense, but in a much more... obscure, but less dangerous, sense. It is more dangerous for us because in general we are prepared to cope with the traditional-type dangers.

[Jucan] What historical or diplomatic figures are models for you?

[Melescanu] To be very frank, Alecsandri is that figure. Once when he was criticized he responded with a quatrain, one of the few quatrains I remember, and I will quote the first two verses for you: "Is there anyone who sings more sweetly than I do? All the better for the country and even better for him." Really I want to do everything that is up to me but, at the same time, I am ready to leave room for someone else, who perhaps can do a better job.

[Jucan] To what extent do you think the result of the U.S. elections and election of Bill Clinton as president will affect us, given the fact that he emphasizes domestic policy as opposed to his predecessor?

[Melescanu] There are two elements that may be relevant and play a negative role for us and it's exactly what you said: We should expect the new administration to concentrate more on domestic policy problems and, thus, neglect foreign policy; the second element is that, traditionally, democratic administrations have attached a

great importance to the problem of human rights. So we should expect that in this area, in which we do not exactly have a favorable image, we will have several matters to correct. These would be the elements which could affect us negatively. However, at the same time, I have a very hopeful that the Clinton team will take an extremely pragmatic and progressive approach. It is impossible that these people who are young and open to argument will not be able to take certain obvious facts into account. The effect of the U.S. elections will depend on us to a great extent.

[Jucan] Within the same context, I want to also ask if you think that once George Bush is gone Romania's relations with the United States will improve or will the opposite be the case?

[Melescanu] The truth is that I do not believe that personality plays a very important role. I think the main difficulty confronting us in our relations with the United States is connected with a principle of physics, a principle of inertia. The bigger a system is, the greater inertia it has. Let us refer to the sea: The bigger a ship is, the greater need it has for more space to make a turn. The problem we have with the Americans is that our image in the United States is about two years behind the times, namely the year 1990 and the miners in Tirgu Mures. A system like this needs time to change. An aside here: In discussions with my colleagues I always have demonstrated the conviction that Romania's image will improve in this period because it was at such a low level it could not have gone any lower. In the case of the United States, relations are developing positively and I think this development will continue, regardless of who heads the presidential team.

[Jucan] You are a career diplomat and you know the interethnic relations both in Romania as well as the world very well. In your opinion, are the coinhabiting nationalities enjoying all the proper rights?

[Melescanu] There are two separate matters here between which I always make a distinction. The first matter is the legal framework that is set in each country to protect human rights, including the rights of those belonging to the minorities, which may be ethnic, religious, matters of sex and other kinds. From this viewpoint, based on the knowledge I have, the system established in Romania by the Constitution and by special laws is at least as good as the best system there is in Europe. There is an automatic system in our Constitution for taking on international regulations in the matter of human rights.

However, there also is a second aspect, that is, the practical application of the system which depends on many more elements and is powerfully influenced by the state's material possibilities and by a certain development of a democratic society and a spirit of tolerance, by the situation of most of the people in the particular country. Undoubtedly we, too, in Romania will see improvements in interethnic relations. At the present

time, four times as much is spent on a child learning in a school where there is a minority language than on a Romanian child. So from the viewpoint of the legal framework and its regulation, we cannot blame ourselves for anything. With regard to application, we are undergoing in a process that both we and others are going through, and which can be improved.

[Jucan] To what extent are disagreements between Romanians and Hungarians affecting official diplomatic relations between Romania and Hungary? If they are affecting them.

[Melescanu] In principle, they should not affect relations in any way. However, from my experience I can tell you that they do affect them and mostly the immediate effect is a negative one. For that reason our concern to ensure, let us say, normal relations with Hungary is not merely a question of principle, because we are at talking about a neighboring country. The firm support of political formations such as the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] on certain basic matters would play a very important role, but unfortunately....

[Jucan] Would you give us your view on the initiative of Mayor Gheorghe Funar to place a quotation from Nicolae Iorga on the base of Matei Corvin's statue?

[Melescanu] This is a domestic policy problem and I should withhold any comment, but I would like to tell you how we in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs see matters. We feel it is in the European spirit that we be concerned with ensuring local autonomy. I think a mayor elected by the majority has the right to put into practice those matters he feels flow from the political program on which basis he was elected, on one condition, that the decisions they adopt not violate the law or dispositions which he adopts. This is the limit, the prism through which I judge things. I do not know whether Mr. Funar violated the law or not.

[Jucan] How long do you think it will take to unite Romania with the Moldovan Republic?

[Melescanu] I think it is a mistake to specify precise timeframes. I will avoid falling into this trap. The process of arriving at a union will have to be a natural one, and should proceed from the bottom up on both sides. If you look right now at the opinion polls both here and in the Moldovan Republic there are reservations and I think the first priority should be developing relations that would permit the evolution of certain mindsets and attitudes..., so that we get to the point where it will happen by itself; I don't think it should be forced. My personal opinion is that I see the problem of union, of reunifying Romania, as a process which will take place parallel with Romania's and Moldova's integration into European structures, because our parallel integration, acceptance of the same system of values, even of certain similar legal regulations, the easing of goods circulation and of capital and of people will lead to a natural coming together.

[Jucan] You recently returned from a long trip to several important cities where you also discussed an important problem—the war in Yugoslavia. Would you care to detail for us the purpose and conclusions of the meetings you had?

[Melescanu] What I retained is that the great majority of countries have rejected the idea of military intervention to solve the Yugoslav problem. This matter was defined very clearly by the Geneva Conference and the great majority of those participating in the discussions came out very clearly. A second matter which impressed me very much was that of recognizing that in the end any actions would be begun from outside and the result would be negotiated between the former Yugoslav republics. In the end, there should be a more marked recognition of the fact that it would not be good or useful to try to throw all the blame on Serbia alone because, really, the Yugoslav conflict is much more complex. This approach, which is simplistic, starts easily and is easy to overcome. The world is awaiting the elections in Yugoslavia. I think that anything can happen and I don't think a reaction from anyone in connection with Serbia is a good one just on the basis of elections.

Probably by the time this interview appears the result will be known and it will be seen that matters are pretty close; I don't think it will be an overwhelming majority of one political formation, but regardless of the result we will have to react according to what they say and do, particularly those who won, and we should not have an automatic reaction of approval if one person wins or disapproval if another one wins. This should be avoided.

[Jucan] We, too, encountered the same approach to our own elections from certain countries.

[Melescanu] Yes, and I think people should be judged according to their actions and not according to labels that some people are interested in hanging on them at one time or another.

[Jucan] After the 1989 revolution we saw a considerable reduction in Romanian-Arab relations. Will they improve?

[Melescanu] Yes, undoubtedly, our priority goal will continue to be our integration in Europe, because we are a European country. The Euro-atlantic Community is the one to which we naturally belong. Romania must utilize the conditions it has, such as our being at a crossroads; actually we are at a priority axis of relations, of connections between Europe and the Arab World. We have some conditions which others do not have in relations with the Arab countries; we have a certain historical experience permitting us to understand the Arabs better and more easily. Also, for reasons I do not wish to discuss here, we have a certain track record in our relations with the Arab countries; of course, this was probably an ideological approach and they were just "progressive" Arabs. My concern will be that by deideologizing relations and continuing to not limit ourselves

just to the "good Arabs," we will really have an important relationship with Arab countries. From this viewpoint one of our goals will be to preserve what we have obtained and to cultivate relations with the Arab countries with which we did not have many contacts.

[Jucan] During your mandate will you stress that Romanian-Chinese relations return to the 1980's level?

[Melescanu] I think that the relationship with China must remain a dominant one regardless of ideology. The main difficulty we must overcome is to replace the priority relationship with China, which was based on ideology, to be open and sincere, with a relationship based on interest. So we have to find elements of interest with respect to China which can be placed at the basis of this privileged relationship, which I feel must continue to exist. One of the following goals is to establish relations with China at the decentralized level and a direct collaboration with the provinces; China is nearly a world in itself. There are many provinces and more than 36 are bigger than Romania, so establishing a direct relationship between regions can be very useful for us.

[Jucan] What is the most important thing you have proposed to do during your mandate?

[Melescanu] I think the most important thing is to ensure that things will return to normal at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So, after a revolutionary and post-revolution period I would very much like for my stay in this ministry to be auspicious. I think that by nature I will play this moderating role. I would like there to be a period in which every person in the ministry feels he has full access to the process of working out decisions and to the process of carrying them out. I would like things to be such that, once I've made a decision, regardless of when that time is—and I do not want to get into a discussion here—I would like to be able to state that I have achieved this.

[Jucan] Do you wish to send a message to EUROPA readers?

[Melescanu] Yes. I would like to tell your readers that in matters of foreign policy it is important for us to promote a national policy, not the policy of one party. We need everyone's help to achieve the great Romanian ideals.

*** Interview With Minister of Culture Slobodnik**

93CH0482A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak
5 Mar 93 p 3

[Interview with Minister of Culture Dusan Slobodnik by Stefan Sugar; date and place not given: "Nobody Is Pushing Anyone Aside"]

[Text] *A certain Czech politician expressed the opinion that when an apartment is in the process of being remodeled, the bookcases must be moved out on the balcony. However, that is not a place suitable for books because it may rain and they would get all wet. However, what is going on in Slovakia? We chatted with the minister of culture of the Slovak Republic, Dusan Slobodnik, about what are the most troublesome problems for Slovakia's culture at this juncture.*

[Sugar] Mr. Minister, what would you do with that bookcase so that it would not impede the introduction of economic reform?

[Slobodnik] No matter what, we would not want to put it out on the balcony because we recognize the enormous importance of culture for shaping human personality. Although our resources are extremely limited—all we received is 250 million korunas for the Pro-Slovakia Foundation—culture is among the priorities of our country. We want to present to the world Slovakia's cultural treasures and therefore, we are already planning huge festivals of Slovak art in Portsmouth, Manchester, and Edinburgh this year. This coming April, Slovakia and its contemporary situation and culture will be introduced in Karlsruhe. We are planning to exhibit Slovak art in various countries of Europe. We intend to send our artists out in the world. However, while in the past only the chosen artists used to travel abroad, now we want all of them to travel, regardless of their political orientation.

[Sugar] Thus far, our Slovak culture has been unable to develop fully and to use the whole capital of its talents because it was stymied not only by the economy but particularly by politics. Slovakia is a huge cemetery of talents buried by politics. Let us name at least the greatest of them: Jozef Ciger-Hronsky and Milo Urban after World War II, Ladislav Novomesky in the 1950's, Dominik Tatarka in the 1970's. Again, the names of undesirable authors are being mentioned. Can this vicious circle be broken at last?

[Slobodnik] That is an extremely interesting question, but it has several aspects. It is true that what you say really did happen in the past because the situation here was not democratic. Today that is no longer possible if we stay with our literature. After November 1989 the Slovak literary community got split into two camps. In one camp there were people who tried vehemently to impose—let us call it so—Czechoslovakism, and who could not so much as imagine the existence of a Slovak state. In the other camp were writers who had Slovakia's independence in their hearts and who kept stressing the significance of its identity. The difference between the

past and the present is that thanks to our democratic system, the pen can be taken away neither from the former nor the latter.

[Sugar] Do you think that the democratic system cannot be rescinded anymore?

[Slobodnik] In my view, internal forces cannot abolish our democratic system, and I firmly believe that it will not happen.

[Sugar] Well, then, what do you think about the statements by certain journalists that democracy in our country is in danger, and that there are signals of a restoration of a totalitarian regime in Slovakia?

[Slobodnik] If anyone alleges that totalitarianism is ascending in Slovakia, then he actually contradicts himself because if censorship really existed, he would not be permitted to publish such allegations. As a private individual, I vehemently disagree with what some authors write, but as a minister, I cannot stop them. Thank God that I cannot because I would not want to be a minister in a system that would authorize me to do so.

[Sugar] Nevertheless, at the news conference held by the editors of SLOVENSKÉ POHLADY, KULTURNÝ ZIVOT, and FRAGMENT K, their representatives characterized your decision to refuse state subsidies to those cultural weeklies as an attack against plurality of opinions and against democracy in our country.

[Slobodnik] The fact that the ministry would not give any grants to those cultural publications can hardly prove that democracy in our country is in jeopardy. Nowhere in the world—in the countries with a market economy, not in the Czech Republic—are cultural magazines getting any financial support from their governments.

[Sugar] Yet the editor in chief of FRAGMENT K alleges that in the Czech Republic cultural publications are receiving subsidies.

[Slobodnik] Then why would Mr. Strasser write in KULTURNÝ ZIVOT that the Czechs envy the financial subsidies that our cultural magazines were still receiving last year? It would be undemocratic if someone banned KULTURNÝ ZIVOT, and that is impossible in our country. It is silly to compare the year 1968 with 1992. At that time the Slovak Press and Information Bureau simply refused to register KULTURNÝ ZIVOT. However, the Ministry of Culture not only cannot ban KULTURNÝ ZIVOT, it cannot save KULTURNÝ ZIVOT by giving it a grant because KULTURNÝ ZIVOT is published by a joint-stock company and our state cannot support such associations. For that reason, we refused to grant subsidies not only to KULTURNÝ ZIVOT but also to LITERARNÝ TYZDENIK. After all, Slovakia is not so affluent as to afford the financing of magazines which have such enormous losses as FRAGMENT K and KULTURNÝ ZIVOT. FRAGMENT K received a subsidy of 1.3 million korunas although its actual printing

amounted to 281 copies. Last year KULTURNY ZIVOT received subsidies of 3.3 million korunas, and this year it demanded 4.75 million korunas when its actual printing is about 1,960 copies. If KULTURNY ZIVOT has so many well-wishers, they should buy and read it so that it may print at least 15 thousand copies. However, I do not fear for the future of KULTURNY ZIVOT. Just mind my words: Money for its publication will be found.

[Sugar] Let us go back to the rift that has split the Slovak artistic intelligentsia. You are of the opinion that the rift was caused by antagonistic attitudes toward the Slovak state itself. However, this rift exploded with approximately the same intensity after the separation of languages, and what Karel Havlicek Borovsky wrote about Ludovit Stur was no more flattering than what the Czech press writes about the current governmental setup.

[Slobodnik] Since you have mentioned the separation of languages I will talk about it a bit. It really continues up to this day. I was convinced about that by Martin Simecka's diatribe against the Slovak literary language. He wrote that the separation of languages was unnecessary and that it would be preferable if we would now write in Czech because he cannot express himself as well in Slovak as he can in Czech. His views were published in SLOVENSKE POHLADY, of all places. In fact, the late editors of SLOVENSKE POHLADY would be turning in their graves if they could read that.

[Sugar] In the 1960's it was precisely the Czech and Slovak culture that fought against the Stalinist model of socialism and thus created the awareness of unity in the Czech and Slovak community. During the first days of the November revolution I could still feel that togetherness of our cultures, but then I lost that feeling. How do you see the future of the much proclaimed Czechoslovak solidarity?

[Slobodnik] I highly respect the Czech culture. For our nation it was enormously important that it could take from that sumptuous table whatever it needed. I have always maintained that unlike our currency and customs union the Czechoslovak cultural unity will continue forever. No one in Slovakia harbors any doubts that our symbiosis with the Czech nation was vitally important for the Slovak nation, but that does not mean that this solidarity has only a festive, noble side and that its far side has not been marked by certain economic discrimination. If some die-hard adherent of Czechoslovakism thinks that I am biased against the Czechs, he should read *Hungary and Its Heirs*, a book by the British scientist McCartney, where he can find quite a number of convincing arguments.

[Sugar] We began our discussion with the problem of the political screening of our writers. Now writers are

screening one another. The self-styled democrats see the Slovaks associated with the Matica Slovenska organization as not democratic enough, while the self-styled Slovaks see the Slovaks associated with KULTURNY ZIVOT as not sufficiently pro-Slovak. How can one determine what pro-Slovak means? For example, some time ago Matuska's criticism of Vajansky was considered anti-Slovak but today Matuska's critical attitude in the reappraisal of Slovakia's history is praised to high heavens.

[Slobodnik] What you said may be nice, but as far as I know, to this day many people have not accepted Matuska's view of Vajansky. What's more, that dispute took place in a literary forum and did not endanger Slovakia's interests. The Slovak Republic is a very young state; it is like a tender plant, and anybody who tells untruth about it harms it. In that sense, Matuska's attitude was anti-Slovak. If a person criticizes the policy of the leaders of his government, that is all right, but if someone alleges, for instance, that the Slovaks intend to drive the Hungarians to the other bank of the Danube, then he is spreading alarmist rumors that may endanger our precarious political stability. We must protect ourselves against that. Now the very idea of Slovakia's statehood is under attack.

[Sugar] Mr. Minister, you learned two foreign languages while in Soviet labor camps, which is an achievement some people cannot emulate even when they're free. How can one study a foreign language in a prison camp?

[Slobodnik] Thank you for this question; finally I'll be able to refute some suspicions. In all modesty, I think that I have a knack for languages. In high school in Zvolen I was good in Latin and also learned French and German. I learned Russian in the camp because I was forced to do so. In addition, I improved my schoolboy French and studied English. I had several good friends who got the books for me I needed because any book published in the Soviet Union could be sent to the camp. I was confined in the camp infirmary for a relatively long time and during that period I spent five hours a day studying French and five hours studying English.

[Sugar] If you had been the director of the Forecasting Institute rather than of the Institute for World Literature before you came to the Ministry of Culture, what would be your prognosis for Slovakia's future development?

[Slobodnik] In my view, most of the people who do not wish Slovakia well will come to their senses in the end and say: We want to live here, and we will live here. And the diehards? They will still be able to voice their opinions, but the response from our nation to them will steadily decline.

[Sugar] Thank you for the interview.

Letter From Macedonian Opposition Coalition

93BA0624B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 23 Jan 93 p 12

[Announcement by the Democratic-Christian Party of Macedonia, Vasil Ristevski chairman, for Organized Political Opposition of Macedonia: "OPOM Appeal"]

[Text] The political parties, members of the Organized Political Opposition of Macedonia (OPOM), discussed at their meeting the status and efficiency of the various associations and assemblies of citizens in the Republic, founded on the basis of a great variety of reasons although not political and not affiliated with any party.

The evaluation was that they act as buccaneers, without any extensive support on the part of political parties, for which reason their demands do not carry any weight with the actual authorities in the Republic. For that reason, OPOM called upon all such associations, in their efforts to exercise their rights, to turn to OPOM and, if their request is deemed justified, OPOM will actively promote unselfishly and will struggle to the end to have their demands considered by the present political leadership in the Republic.

OPOM also informs such new nonparliamentary political parties that are unwilling to remain on the periphery of the Macedonian political stage to request in writing to be accepted as members of the OPOM. They will thus gain equality among equals and will become significant and active political entities in Macedonia.

*** RSM-LP Criticizes Macedonian Government, PDP**

93BA0628A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 3 Feb 93 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Major Governmental Retreat"]

[Text] *Some activities related to the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia have created a confusion, for which reason we believe that the government should ask the parliament for a vote of confidence. A civil structure must be created for society and the state in order to suppress nationalistic and other collectivistic frustrations in political life and, in general, among the public. The Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVR] must be radically reorganized. The matter of the Law on the Conversion of Enterprises With Public Capital is progressing unsatisfactorily. The relationship between countries and politics.*

The participation of the RSM [Reformist Forces of Macedonia]-Liberal Party in the Macedonian government is based essentially on two reasons:

1. In general, the need for having a government which can count on a parliamentary majority in the present convocation of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia; and

2. The relevance and urgency of some basic programmatic stipulations of our party, the implementation of which requires our participation in the government.

We believe that as long as there is a government of experts (referred to in the rest of the world as technocrats or bureaucrats), the electoral process in our country remains incomplete, for the executive authority is not based on the results of elections through which the electorate has expressed its will. This shortcoming, caused by the imperfect democratic electoral process, has been frequently pointed out by our numerous friends abroad. Actually, the fact that only two representatives have given a vote of confidence in the government of experts clearly indicated the groundlessness and lack of political support of that government. This also explains the initiative of our group of representatives of raising the question of confidence in the government of experts.

In discussions on the participation of our party in a government based on a parliamentary majority, we formulated two main requests and stipulated that we were not prepared to abandon them. They were the following:

1. Hastening the process of international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and consolidation of its international status;

2. Internal consolidation by hastened development of new social and state institutions based on the Constitution.

Having heard the presentation of the then candidate for prime minister, we thought that our demands had been essentially accepted. After the representatives of other parties voted for the proposed government and its program, we realized that our demands had been accepted by the entire parliamentary majority.

In analyzing the work done so far by the government, the RO [Republic Committee] of the RSM-Liberal Party determined, at its meeting of 17 November 1992, that the government had made a major retreat concerning the agreed-upon tasks. At the same time, it made it incumbent upon the executive committee to organize and hold firm discussions with the leaderships of the other parties participating in the government, to assess the circumstances and conditions for further work by the government, and to issue an opinion concerning our further participation in the government. The present material was drafted by the IO [Executive Committee] to facilitate the further course of such discussions. It presents our assessment of the situation and our views on the steps which must be taken by the government in the immediate future in the matter of such basic issues. We called the material "Platform," although some of its aspects have not been developed more extensively. This is normal, however, for their extensive elaboration should take place in the course of the discussions.

**Platform of the RSM-Liberal Party
on the Activities of a Parliamentary Majority
on Some Basic Issues**

**I. On the Process of the International Recognition
of the Republic of Macedonia**

1. The foreign policy, the basic frameworks of which were approved by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, and were being actively interpreted and implemented by Kiro Gligorov, the president of the Republic, has no alternative. The direct implementation of such a policy has brought to light certain controversial issues in the former "expert" government, which became public and hindered such a policy. This was one of the several reasons for raising the issue of a vote of confidence in that government. Our party determined that Mr. Malevski, as minister of relations with foreign countries, was doing a good job in the implementation of that policy and that he should keep his position in the new government as well. We asked him to become part of our own ticket but also said that we would support him in any government that could be formed. In the final account, we made another concession as far as our principles were concerned, agreeing that Mr. Malevski be accepted as part of no one's ticket, i.e., simply as an expert. We did all this in the belief that our foreign policy had been properly conducted as approved, and that in the present period it is important for such a policy to be continued. Obviously, the same or similar assessments were reached by the other parties participating in the government. Essentially, the mandator Crvenkovski strictly observed such assessments in his presentation to the Assembly, and all representatives of the parties forming the parliamentary majority agreed with these assessments by voting for them.

2. The process of international recognition of the Republic was postponed but also intensified, entering its critical phase. External and internal pressures on the Republic as well as the government increased.

However, in connection with another as yet unclarified subject—the Bit-Pazar events—there arose dangerous controversies within the parties in the parliamentary majority, precisely on the issue of the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. On 8 November 1992, Mr. Sami Ibraimi, PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] deputy chairman, came out with the demand that the Republic of Macedonia not be recognized, a demand that was voiced on Greek television. A similar step was taken by the coordinator of the PDP group of representatives. Nevzat Halili, the PDP chairman, also made insufficiently clear statements, harming the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. The leadership of the NDP [National Democratic Party], which is the PDP's coalition partner, called upon all the relevant international entities not to recognize the Republic of Macedonia.

3. All such activities are aimed at questioning and even opposing the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, i.e., they are aimed against the main state

interests of the Republic of Macedonia. Without going at this point into the reasons for such an attitude displayed by said personalities and parties, and we are prepared to discuss said reasons and their eventual elimination. However, we do not support the view that there may be reasons for which a citizen or association of citizens or a political party, regardless of the ethnic origin of its members, as long as they are citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, could work against the basic interest of its state—its international recognition.

We believe that because of all such activities a confusion has developed about the government, for which reason we consider this a sufficient reason for the government to ask for a vote of confidence in parliament precisely on this issue—the issue of its foreign policy. We expect of the representatives who are members of the PDP faction, along with representatives of other groups which constitute the parliamentary majority, to vote in favor of the foreign policy of the government and thus to support the government. Only thus will it be possible to clarify the present confusion and to significantly lower the mistrust not only of the government and the Assembly but also in the area of interethnic relations.

**II. Internal Consolidation of
the Republic of Macedonia**

The process of internal consolidation of the Republic of Macedonia has become substantially more difficult because of the international isolation and outside blockades. However, even under those circumstances it would be possible to hasten the process of internal consolidation. This is possible by boldly abandoning the status quo and energetically developing a new structure of a civil society and contemporary political and state institutions and introducing methods and solutions inherent in the rule of law and the freedom of the market and private enterprise.

Specific systematic and efficient steps must be taken to hasten the process of internal consolidation in the Republic of Macedonia.

A. Necessary systemic decisions

We believe that we must more daringly abandon the status quo and adopt a clear orientation in structuring the new institutions of the civil society, consistent with the Constitution. Stagnation in this process would inevitably lead to another strengthening of the collectivistic options that are the foundations of a new possible totalitarianism. The collectivistic options are manifested through the strengthening of national homogenization of Macedonians and Albanians, on the one hand, and the issue of the privatization of public property, on the other. These trends, as does national homogenization, threaten to cause mass ethnic quarrels and, as egalitarian demands for the revival of public property, could compromise the Republic of Macedonia as being the last nest of socialism. This makes necessary a strong political emphasis on the creation of a civil structure in society

and the state in order to suppress the nationalistic and other collectivistic frustrations in political life and in public life in general.

It was precisely such assessments that guided us in our discussions on forming a government. In accordance with our programmatic stipulations, we tried to take over some ministries which, in our view, required major changes.

We consider the essence of this situation and its resolution from several aspects:

1. We believe that the present position, structure, and authority of the MVR are a typical product of the concept of the state of real socialism. It has been quite some time since the police have had so much influence in the shaping of political life and in the "creation" of a political atmosphere in the country. One way or another, through their political assessments or political views the police are extensively present in the economy, in some political parties, and even in some editorial rooms. This place held by the MVR and their tremendous power do not, naturally, help the state in functioning more successfully. Conversely, it could lead to a serious atrophy of all democratic processes in the country.

For that reason, we believe that that ministry must be fundamentally reorganized. It should be in charge only of maintaining public order and peace, with all else to be transferred to other ministries with similar functions, such as the Ministries of the Economy, Finance, (Justice), and Administration, or else to separate directorates or agencies (such as the information service or the service for registering vehicles and driver testing), and so on. Actually, it is necessary to structure this entire area as it is structured in Western democratic countries. What concerns us the most presently is the fact that one year after the adoption of the Constitution we have no programs for reforming the MVR but, conversely, there is a tendency to strengthen its former role. That is why we insist that the government provide a framework program for the reorganization of the present Ministry of Internal Affairs within no less than two months. However, the resolution to submit and implement such a program must be a prerequisite for a vote of confidence in the government.

2. We believe that a high percentage of the opposition coming from the Ministry of Justice has not been eliminated, but we also know that in order to develop an independent judiciary long-term efforts will be required. For the time being, we fail to understand the opposition of that ministry to passing the law on the people's defender. Nonetheless, we believe that the government will be able to surmount such opposition.

3. It is unacceptable that today, one year after the adoption of the Constitution, the Public Accounting Service has remained unchanged and has even been assigned new duties, such as it did not have under the previous system (such as settling accounts with foreign countries). We are surprised that in the area of the

development of new financial institutions, which are inherent in a free market and free-enterprise system, neither the old nor the current government initiated the formulation of a comprehensive program to cut the notorious knot of the SOK [Public Accounting Service]. We believe that formulation of such a program to be of exceptional importance.

4. Work on the Law on the Conversion of Enterprises With Public Capital is unsatisfactory. The concept is being excessively, extensively, and aggressively explained, but nothing is being done to explain where this concept was tested and what results were achieved. The parliament has not been presented with facts on the existence of other privatization concepts, their location, and their results.

We presented our views on such issues in the course of the debate in the Assembly on the draft of this law. Our impression is that our statements were not considered seriously. That is why we would be regretfully forced to vote against this draft law.

5. In order to create the required structure of a civil society and state, determining the relationship among the civil, political, and state areas is very important. This is a very complex matter and its overall structuring is a truly historical process. We have fallen seriously behind in the development of this process. We are concerned, however, by the ways such relations are being structured on an entirely wrong basis. For example, the leaderships of civil interest groups and other associations and organizations of a clearly nongovernmental and nonpolitical nature should not include state leaders or members of party leaderships. Yet in the Republic of Macedonia such associations and organizations are headed by members of the government or else members of party leaderships. This ascribes such associations and organizations not a civil form but the form of the old "transmission belts" from the time of socialism, through which the party manipulated the masses.

In connection to such problems, laws must be passed on eliminating the consequences of discriminatory rules affecting the citizens, on the basis of which citizens have been prosecuted and sentenced for political crimes. Such sentences must be revoked, so that the entire area of civic life would become more or less clean.

Equally unclear is the relationship between the governmental and the political areas. In this case, some rules pertaining to the so-called depoliticization of state authorities have been issued. However, there is also an obvious process of penetration of political parties within state authorities and suborning the latter to the parties. Conversely, some members of the state security service have even penetrated some of the party leaderships. For that reason, we must pass without delay the law on political parties and restructure the rules governing associations of citizens unrelated to political organizations, so that the Republic of Macedonia could soon provide a true civil environment. Until then, the members of the

government and of the party leaderships should keep away from nongovernmental and nonpolitical associations and organizations of citizens, such as various chambers, foundations, Helsinki conferences, and so on.

6. We must intensify work on the set of electoral laws. The government must at least formulate concepts of such laws that may prove to be quite controversial. However, debates on such laws would also constitute a development of democracy in our state. In that area as well we find ourselves in a rather illogical situation: One year has passed since the adoption of the Constitution and the government has not even started work on this entire set of laws. Naturally, this is, above all, the omission of the previous government. However, it would be normal to expect of the present government to update such assignments and being to implement them faster.

B. Governmental activities aimed at the further consolidation of the Republic of Macedonia

Considering the existing rather chaotic economic developments, we must gradually take specific steps to make the more rational interrelationship among the subjects involved in business life possible. Let us list no more than a few such steps.

1. The government must settle as soon as possible the entire area of the civil air transport. Delays in this area are inadmissible and unjustified. A variety of statements have been made that the present government as a whole is no different from the unpopular government of "experts."

2. All business transactions paid in cash must be subject to fees and other dues paid to the Republic budget. This would partially compensate for the avoidance of the payment of taxes and will provide a material backing for the cost of printing new money.

3. The Ministry of Finance should take all the necessary measures to ensure that taxes are paid.

4. Currency exchange operations should be liberalized.

5. The stipulation by virtue of which relations among currencies are frozen on the day the devaluation takes place must be amended.

This stipulation, which is still in effect and is economically untenable, reflects, from the political viewpoint, an imperfect marketplace attitude.

In the course of the debates, we shall bring forth other such stipulations but we expect a similar contribution on the part of the other participants as well.

Finally, we assure you that the only objective of this initiative is to take a more serious step in the creation of the structures of a civil society and state, for this is the only way for more substantially rejecting a status quo which triggers conflicts on a collectivistic basis and keeps us in the magic circle of hopelessness.

*** Macedonia Considers Law on Election Finances**

93BA0624A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 4 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by L. Kitanovska: "A Condition for Financing: 5 Percent of the Vote"]

[Text] *State funds are allocated as follows: 60 percent goes to those who have garnered no less than 5 percent of the vote in the latest elections, and the remaining 40 percent to parties whose candidates were elected to parliament, in proportion to the number of their representatives.*

The Law on Political Parties, together with the Law on the Election of Representatives to the Macedonian Assembly, and the Law on the Election of a President of the Republic of Macedonia, must be passed no later than three months prior to the holding of new elections. There is not even a trace of the last two laws, while the Law on Political Parties was already drafted by the previous government, by the Ministry of Justice and Administration, respectively. Recently, after it was reviewed and deemed fully consistent with its purpose, the Branko Crvenkovski's government supported this draft and everything seems to indicate that it will be included in the agenda of the next parliamentary session.

According to that law, any organized group of citizens who would like to participate in the government is considered a political party. Therefore, the purpose of founding a political party can be exclusively the exercise and protection of the political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and beliefs of its members, who must participate in the process of making political decisions and also in the activities to elect representatives to the Macedonian Assembly and members of township councils.

This is followed by a stipulation directly borrowed from the Constitution: that the programmatic documents of the party may not be aimed at the violent overthrow of the system, inciting or calling for military aggression, or promoting national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance. It was on the basis of this one and only way that the Constitutional Court acted in the case of the NDP [National Democratic Party] declaration, by ruling some of its stipulations unconstitutional, thus giving the party time to make them consistent with constitutional requirements. Since that was the extent to which the court intervened in this case, the question arises of the justification of such resolutions if no mechanism for their implementation exists.

The fact that following the increase in the number of parties in our political life the issue arises that the registering of parties with similar names is not regulated by the law. The registering authority must not take this into consideration.

In connection with the party symbols, so far there have been several heated debates. Nowhere else in the world have party symbols dared to coincide with the symbols

of the state, whether one's own or foreign. More specifically, this applied to the lion, as an element of the state seal and flag. The argument against, in the debates, was precisely that this symbol was identified with a given political party. Although its supporters clearly stated that if this symbol is adopted as a symbol of the state they would abandon it as a party symbol, this argument was no help precisely because it called for accepting their "word of honor."

Also of interest will be the stipulations on the financing of political parties. According to the law, some of the funds will come from the Republic budget and 60 percent will go to the political parties that have garnered no less than 5 percent of the votes in the last elections, while the remaining 40 percent will go to parties whose candidates were elected to the Republic Assembly, in proportion to the number of their representatives. This way the government will have less opportunity to manipulate and fewer possibilities of repeating the error according to which with its resolution (which was later annulled) it based the appropriations only on criteria known exclusively to the government. However, the fact that there is bound to be a debate on this issue is quite well confirmed by the fact that the law does not deal with opposition parties and with parties which, for one reason or another, have no representatives in parliament. In order to feel the pulse beat and determine the views on such a law, the parties themselves remain the most competent entities, as well as, naturally, the representatives.

*** Pluralism, Party Patronage System in Macedonia**

93BA0640A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 13 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by L. Kitanovska: "Interparty Struggle for Directors Seats"]

[Text] *Uniformity of thought has not been forsaken even in pluralism.*

It is an open secret that after any one of the several important director's positions has been vacated, the telephones "ring like mad," many contacts are made in private, and all this under the guise of the formulation "consultation and gathering ideas." The Republic Committee for Elections and Nominations most frequently gives consent that is identified with a directive "from above."

One of the official matters that constantly occurs in the public life of the Republic is the appointment, i.e., the selection of the leaders of the business enterprises and the institutions that are of broader significance. In practice, this is a matter of the attractiveness of the leadership function in typically monopolistic enterprises. Here the parties see the possibility for creating strong support for their power because, quite logically, by occupying such an important position, the party that

has placed its man there will have a hand in the entire area which the respective enterprise "directs."

Thus, in spite of the ever greater spread of the phenomenon which the media have called "falling of directors," interest in the Office of Director has not decreased. The contradiction is very apparent. The dissatisfaction of the workers with the bad state of the economy (and not only of the economy) is expressed through the use of the law of the street and replacement of leaders through strikes, but only in, relatively speaking, the less important businesses. Again, those that are at the top of the list with respect to influence in overall public life in the Republic are light years away from the workers who are employed in them. Most often, because of the transformation of such enterprises into public, that is, state institutions, but also because of the change in the status of joint-stock companies, where influence is achieved depending upon the participation with purchased stocks. The authorities in power always have insisted on placing their people in key positions who act as their extended arm. The principle of trusted individuals, which came to be exploited during the period of uniformity of thought, has not been abandoned even in multipartyism. It is an open secret that after any one of the several important director's positions has been vacated, the telephones "ring like mad," many private contacts are made in private, and all this under the guise of the formulation "consultations and gathering ideas." And no one wants to speak publicly until everything is done. And to be done in present conditions means that the candidate is chosen much before the official beginning of the procedure.

Reciprocity of Favors

How much all this has legal support is the question that disturbs the people who, as a rule, are far from the center of events. In the chaos in which we are now, everything is possible, says one of the interlocutors, a member of the political elite who wanted to remain anonymous. The biggest problem is in the lack of regulations that would deal with the differentiation of the responsibilities between the government and the business enterprises. For example, the misunderstandings with "Makpetrol" were precisely of this nature. "Makpetrol" was a joint-stock company only when it suited the government. However, the government set the price for the petroleum derivatives. "Makpetrol" earned currency for the government. The reciprocity in mutual "favors" was converted into a network with finely interwoven threads. When there is not strict delimitation of the jurisdictions, many things depend upon the man who is at the head. A business of this kind, which is not controlled with strict laws and regulations, may easily get out of control. Actually, this is precisely what happened, and thence the pledges that a competing public enterprise that will force "Makpetrol" to "calm down" will be formed.

With respect to the classical public enterprises there are no dilemmas here. These are state enterprises "from head to heel" and there is no alternative except for the leader to be the result of consensus of the government

coalition. Even those whose names are mentioned for such functions react much more strongly to the question of how they got to the top of the list, than would be expected taking account of the obvious situation. Who can find something amiss here? Everything is clear! There is no chance that job selection will be done differently. And so on until it is engraved into our consciousness that this is the way it has to be.

And how does the selection procedure actually look? In the case of a joint-stock company, the business enterprise has to conduct all phases of the procedure with the exception of all kinds of interference on the part of the government or the Assembly. The public enterprises need approval from the Commission for Selections and Nominations of the Assembly. And agreement is not given just so. The president of this commission, Nikola Krstevski, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], explains that, although the competitive procedure formally takes place in the enterprise itself, before it gives its consent the Assembly carries out consultations and gathers opinions from the responsible ministries with respect to the already chosen candidate! The previous Assembly and this Assembly (?) were given this responsibility, and nothing is done outside of the regulations, Krstevski says. Concerning the significance of this agreement, very illustrative is the fact that if it is not given, it is considered that, in general, there will be no action and everything will begin again. Of course, only with a new candidate, who will be more suitable. However, as a rule, if the committee gives a green light for any person, he will pass the Assembly session without any problems. This is not strange if one understands the composition of this committee. There are four members from VMRO-DPMNE, the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] is represented by three, PDP-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity-National Democratic Party] has two, two are from RSM-LP [Reformist Forces-Liberal Party], the Socialist Party has one, and one is an independent deputy. In other words, the parliament in miniature. Still if one bears in mind that, if he includes coordinators of the parliamentary groups, the consensus reached in the committee automatically is a consensus in the parliament.

Under Whose "Hat"?

An obvious chance for potential manipulations was created with the beginning of the work of the committee. It decided with a majority of the members present! Perhaps it is logical to expect that VMRO-DPMNE will have the main word here because of its representation. But this is not so. Up to now not one candidate of this party has passed through this committee, Krstevski says. There is no other interpretation except that the position is much stronger than the opposition. And VMRO is opposition. And what does a member of the opposition say, how can they seek authority in a state enterprise when they oppose this government authority?!

This is the case with the Post Office, and with the Electrical Industry of Macedonia, and with the Customs House.... The employees do not have and cannot have influence in the selection of their director. Another is concerned with this. The Customs House does not even have an institution—a workers union. They do not need one, the authorities says, they need only to do their work and be quiet, fortunate that they have someone else to think for them. The unique quarrel between the executive and legislative branches show how important it is under whose "hat" the Customs House will be. Namely, the government in the proposed law sought to have direct jurisdiction over it, and the Commission for Selections and Nominations succeeded in "inserting" the amendment that gives this authority to the Assembly.

However, there are cases where the Assembly also selects without the camouflage of giving consent. This always happens when this body is a founder, as in the example of the MIA [possibly Macedonian News Agency].

With respect to this it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a tendency, less and less secret, to create monopolies. Without exception, all of our interlocutors agree that this is counter to the new constitutional order, however, it is an irrefutable fact. They find the "justification" in the early phase of parliamentarism and multipartyism in our country, which has to lay a foundation for stronger positions for the future. However, this all entails another great danger. In the case that there is a change in the top of the government, does this mean a radical revolution in the way of managing these institutions? It is always more difficult for the people to change consciousness and conviction. While things are being done this way, and for the time being there is no chance that this will be changed (because either everything is legal or there is no law and it is allowed), the path toward progress will be debatable.

* Macedonia Considers Firearms Law

93BA0625A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 4 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Z. Petrov: "No License Without Good Reason"]

[Text] According to a government proposal, any person owning and carrying a weapon without a license will be fined one or one and one-half wage payments or by imprisonment for 30 days. Guns and ammunition seized in a criminal investigation procedure will be turned over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVR] and used for official ministry purposes.

A government proposal to enact a law amending the law on acquisition, possession, and carrying of weapons will soon be submitted to representatives in the Assembly of Macedonia. The abbreviated procedure should be followed, because the proposal is also to be considered as one for enactment of a law. On the whole, the amendments offered deal mostly with terminological changes,

that is, textual coordination, in keeping with the need for approval and introduction of the new statutory terminology.

What is more interesting, however, and deserves mention as a particular feature of this draft law, are the new penal provisions. What in essence is involved is the need for reconciliation with the amendments to the law on crimes (enacted last year). Thus, in place of the prescribed fines expressed in dinars, which would be subject to frequent change because of inflation, fines will be prescribed and established in amounts expressed in average wages for the most recent month as determined by the Republic Bureau of Statistics. The goal to be reached by means of these statistics is increase in the effectiveness of penal policy; as a result of the ongoing devaluation of the dinar, the fines currently imposed under this law are not at all commensurate with the nature and seriousness of the crimes. What is more important is that the goal of punishment is not reached at all by means of the fines.

What will probably be of the greatest interest to readers is the new draft article, which, for example, punishes unlawful possession or carrying of a weapon. Article 32, Section 2, of the current law states that a person owning and carrying a weapon without a valid license will be punished by a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 dinars or by imprisonment for 30 days. The government proposal regarding this crime calls for a fine in the amount of one to two and one-half wage amounts. Mention should also be made of the provision amending Article 22 of the law. The new version of this article directs that arms and ammunition seized in the course of a criminal investigation are to be turned over to the MVR and may also be sold to individuals and corporations meeting the requirements set by this law. The purpose of this change, according to the preamble, is to satisfy the needs of the MVR for using such weapons to arm its personnel. At the same time, it is pointed out that weapons with no owner have recently been found in certain operations or inspections. Inasmuch as modern and new firearms are involved in many cases, the sensible thing to do is to turn them over to the MVR for official use. On the other hand, again according to the preamble, the ministry retains the option of selling little used arms of older types to individuals and corporations.

Careful reading of the law on acquisition, possession, and carrying of weapons (enacted in 1972) shows that there are no changes at all in the article dealing with the requirements for obtaining a gun license. Article 9 states among other things that the MVR is not to give permission for acquisition of a weapon if it finds that a person applying for permission has no justifiable reason for owning and carrying such a weapon or if this is against the interests of law and order. This essentially is a provision enhancing the discretionary power of the police in deciding who can and who cannot obtain a gun license. In other words, if an applicant satisfies the three general requirements (is not a minor, is not mentally ill, and has no criminal record) he can still be turned down

unless he has a 'justifiable' reason for owning or carrying a pistol. Under the conditions now emerging, with relationships of a new type being established in society and the rapid social differentiation of citizens, an increasing number of citizens are forced precisely for these reasons to obtain a weapon in the well-known way. But according to MVR public safety under secretary Pavle Trajanov, work is now in progress on a new law on acquisition, possession, and carrying of weapons. In many respects it will take an entirely different approach to this problem. According to Trajanov, the basic purpose of the current proposed amendment to the existing law is specific changes in terminology and reconciliation with other laws.

Weapons Smuggling in Macedonia Viewed

93BA0625B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 6-7 Feb 93 pp 4-5

[Article by Kosta Popovski: "Is the Border a Sieve Through Which Death Is Pouring?"]

[Text] *Over the last 12 months more than 30 cases of illegal, organized importation of all kinds of weapons across Macedonian borders have been detected in cities around the country. The incidents have occurred chiefly in the interior of the country—in hotels, warehouses, and restaurants, not at border crossings themselves. Some customs officials have colluded with the lowest gun runners, because of greed and with no concern for the consequences of their behavior.*

The sale of weapons, a crime once unknown in Macedonia, is a very common indictable offense. The sale of rifles and pistols, automatic weapons, bombs, grenade launchers, military radios, automatic pistols, missiles, protective and military uniforms, all kinds of ammunition and explosives, helmets, and gas masks has recently gone beyond the scope of small-scale black-marketing and underground delivery of weapons in Macedonia and has become a high-priority business yielding thousands in foreign currencies, but it has brought with it black-mail, murder, extortion, kidnapping, and everything else accompanying the most dangerous underground business, weapons smuggling.

The sale of weapons is obvious everywhere in Macedonia today, on the ground and in the air. Weapons are not being brought in simply for the sake of illegal sales, but to arm a large number of citizens of the country.

Support for Statement

What were once illicit goods on the black market in Skopje and in several other cities of Macedonia, such as Tetovo, Gostivar, Kichevo, Kriva Palanka, and with increasing frequency also in Gevgelija, are now on sale everywhere in the country. With a little persistence, anyone can obtain any type of weapon and ammunition. A person can buy literally anything in the arsenal of military ordnance (infantry and artillery), if he has hard currency: new or slightly used Kalashnikovs, Scorpions,

Markovs, Magnums, Smith & Wessons, Mausers, bombs, hand grenades, and plastic explosives, offensive or defensive. No one can deny the factual impression that our environment has become a bazaar of mostly imported weapons.

Weapons are pouring in from all directions. They are coming through all the border-crossing points as if these crossings were Swiss cheese. But this is being done treacherously by persons who have the duty of defending border crossings, and in most cases even with their consent. There is evidence of all kinds showing that those who are paid and are responsible for repelling smuggling of this type at border crossings are almost working hand in glove with the lowest, most incorrigible arms dealers.

And we immediately find confirmation of this fact that all the smuggling groups and the people in them arrested as arms dealers have been discovered as it were at home, around the cities, in hotels, cafes, shacks, and warehouses, but in Skopje also inside the government and not at border crossing points (only two cases so far). Nor should we forget that all the weapons are of foreign origin, like those brought in at the border crossings or near them. Another specific event in connection with this statement: on 12 April 1992, at the Skopje Grand Hotel in Skopje, the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] detected and arrested two persons (Macedonian and Bulgarian Government officials) who had 31 pistols with them.

At the later trial it was proved that this arsenal (together with several thousand rounds of ammunition) entered Macedonia after passing through as many as four government-controlled border crossing points, including one in Macedonia (Deve Bair). Also, on 18 July 1992, three sellers of more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition (3 German marks [DM]) brought in by a retired military person (through the Kumanovo border crossing) were apprehended. On 19 September, again in Skopje, among other things 18 automatic rifles (each worth DM3,000), grenade-launcher attachments, and grenades, even 200 kg of ammunition, offensive and defensive bombs, and whatnot were seized in a warehouse (in Saraj). The investigation revealed that all these things were brought across nine mountains, in Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and through a border crossing in Macedonia (Deve Bair). That is, the dangerous cargo passed through all these border-crossing points like schoolboys in pursuit of the prettiest girl.

Retraining

From the time all these items were brought in to the present, the same customs officials have remained at this border crossing. This hot shipment, and there have been 30 just as hot over the last 12 months, is itself incriminating. There are honest customs officials at the border crossings, but there are dishonest ones as well. And so more than 30 such shipments have passed through the Macedonian border crossings and have been unloaded in

various towns around the country, and no one stopped them. The few that have been detected at the border-crossing points (in all, as many shipments as fingers on one hand) could be characterized as owing detection to crafty tactics by dishonest customs officials to make certain to have the detection of these few reported. All these shipments were stopped at the border crossings, in cities or along international highways, by the MVR. Where are the unknown arms shipments that MVR agencies were unable to stop? There are at least 30 times as many shipments that were not detected. Pure chance, then, is the largest factor in Macedonia in detection of this highly dangerous crime. The hot chestnuts were always pulled out of the fire by accidental detections of gangs of smugglers. And once again let us explain the statement that it is abundantly clear that there is something rotten at the border-crossing points. The truth of this statement is also indicated by the fact that 200 rifles, a large number of pistols, ammunition, and a few bombs have been seized over the last 12 months. Up to the present there has been no recorded case of detection of an artillery piece or a tank. Will there ever be one?

Kosta Petrevski, public prosecutor in the Skopje Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office, stated the following in a discussion of criminals engaging in arms smuggling:

"We can say that this type of crime is moved from the bottom to the top of court dockets. Indictment, trial, and conviction for illegal possession of weapons and explosives are now routine in prosecutorial work in other municipal courts, not just in Skopje. In a sense, the smugglers are being retrained. They are forgetting their days working on farms and as barbers. Now groups and individuals, either in an organized manner or at random, bring in weapons of all kinds. Then they market them in the most brazen manner, making fortunes in the process. All the dirty deeds discovered in the course of investigation of the smugglers indicate that the people are in this business so that they can live the good life. They do not care whom they are arming. We can say that arms dealing is not in the least an innocent business and that it is assuming terrifying dimensions. In my opinion, the closing of a few 'pipelines' is merely incidental and only a well-organized campaign can lead to destruction of this evil."

Sparks

Exactly two months ago a small spark was struck between the MVR and the customs officials. On the suspicion that some customs officials were taking bribes and appropriating goods taken by customs as samples for testing, along with other breaches of public trust, a dozen customs officials at the Kumanovo border crossing were called in for a 'talk' and taken to the local police station. Here foreign currency and goods that they could not prove belonged to them were taken away from them.

On one recent occasion Blagoja Stanoevski, director of the Skopje customs office, stated among other things, in connection with the increasing frequency of offenses

committed by some customs personnel, that "the majority of the customs workers do their work conscientiously and professionally, but over the last three months there have been cases detected in which customs personnel have succumbed to temptation and have violated the principle of dignified and responsible operation of the service. For instance, one customs official at the Tabanovtse border crossing was caught taking a bribe to approve release of a truck carrying four tons of cigarettes that ended up in warehouses around the country. Disciplinary action was also taken against a customs official for abuse of office in falsifying a signature. There are two cases of customs officers unlawfully exchanging foreign currency for dinars; one of the cases was reported by a citizen. There is indication of taking of goods and products by customs officers in the form of examples for testing purposes, but this is reported only about things for which there are no written applications. Even though these are isolated, individual cases, they are troubling. It must be said that the same work force at the three customs offices is now coping with a work load that is five to eight times greater than it was. Negotiations with the MVR are continuing."

In the MVR, detection and apprehension of the perpetrators of crimes in the form of unlawful possession of weapons and explosives (dealing) are done by teams, and we are honoring their request to be mentioned.

In response to the question of how it is possible for such a large amount of weapons to be brought into the country without the perpetrators being caught at the border crossings, an official at the MVR admitted that as much as 90 percent of the gangs detected are apprehended after weapons have been brought into the country, but there is a reason for this, in that the northern border is crossed outside the area of the check points. This official also stated that large-scale shipment of arms into Macedonia from neighboring countries has been observed this year. Thirty-one pipelines for illegal trade in arms, ammunition, and explosives have been closed off. Authorities have seized 59 special (automatic) rifles, nine military rifles, a large number of sniper rifles, 10 hand grenades, several hundred pistols, 25,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and an unknown number of pistol bullets. In addition to the border crossings, gun runners use illegal corridors (to Serbia and Albania), and 1,500 weapons of different kinds have been taken from citizens in only a few routine checks. To be added are a large number of camouflage uniforms, gas masks, and bulletproof vests on sale almost everywhere in Skopje, Tetovo, and Gostivar.

Unknown Collusion

An increasing number of cases in the municipal courts of Skopje and around the country each year relate to trials of persons charged with unlawful possession of weapons or explosives (Article 218, Section 2 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Macedonia).

On 12 December 1992, Nezir Galip was sentenced in Skopje Municipal Court to three years and six months imprisonment for having been detected bringing 20 pistols into Macedonia through a border crossing. At the trial, both the defense and the prosecution asked him how he had managed to bring the arms through the border crossing. In his defense, the defendant fully admitted the act, stating that when he entered the Deve Bair checkpoint, no one inspected his "Golf." This raises the suspicion that the local customs officials may have known of the "shipment" before he came to the checkpoint and allowed him to pass through without interference.

This case and several other ones in the courts indicate that everything is not under the control of the customs authorities, particularly when it comes to shipments or transactions made by private businessmen.

* Macedonian Minister of Agriculture Interviewed

93BA0629A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 6 Feb 93 p 13

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture Eftim Anceev by Borjana Dicevska on 6 February; place not given: "We Shall Surmount the Old Weaknesses"]

[Text] *Until the plan for the development of agriculture through the year 2010 has been prepared, we are contemplating the taking of so-called annual short-term measures to improve the situation in the various areas. Protective prices for six commodities: wheat, sunflower, sugar beets, tobacco, beef, and veal.*

The poor situation in agriculture, which has caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the farmers, manifested through the organization of a general strike, protests, meetings, blockage of roads, and so on, is being dramatized. Above all, this is manifested through the obvious revolt caused by the still-unpaid funds for last year's crops, unsold goods that are still piled up in stores and barns, violated contacts with most markets, the problems which arose with the petroleum blockade and the UN sanctions taken against some of the former Yugoslav republics, and so on. The fact that these steps were taken by the government, and that pressure was applied by the other executive authorities of the state, is obvious. However, it is difficult to see how future problems will be resolved without difficulty, the more so since a number of practical examples have indicated that problems in agriculture are being resolved only partially and on the basis of the poor legacy of the past rather than systematically and thoughtfully.

This was the main topic of today's conversation with Minister of Agriculture Eftim Anceev, which includes a description of some of the activities and steps taken this year for intervening in several areas related to agriculture.

Property Conversion

[Dicevska] How justified are the reactions and protests of the farmers, since the system of protective measures will be giving them what they want: protective prices for 12 commodities based on the parity price of wheat?

[Ancev] Unfortunately, it is precisely this extension of the list of protected goods with approved protective prices that seems to be one of the main sources of farmers' discontent and reaction. Specifically, in order to respond to the farmers pressure, last June the previous government passed a resolution on introducing protective prices for 12 commodities. It was based on the protective price of wheat for bread of 120 denars per kg, in accordance with the previous correlation in the price parity based on wheat and other farm goods. It is true that at that time this step had a stimulating effect and thus, to a certain extent, eliminated any eventual reaction on the part of the producers. Above all, it should be known that the then-protected price of tobacco, for example, of 1,800 denars per kg, equaled five German marks. However, at the very start of the autumn, these protective prices no longer had the same exchange ratio with the strong currency, as a result of which the farmers immediately called for another price correction. They specifically asked for an automatic periodical price changes, based on hard currency. Such conversion was impossible, not only because of the shortage of funds, for we were dealing with prices on the basis of which the state guaranteed the purchase of all of these 12 items, but above all because of competition in world prices and on the world market. The protective price of rice, for example, made it much higher than the price charged worldwide. The cases of many other commodities were similar.

Hence we cannot blame the farmers for their dissatisfaction and mass reaction, for it was precisely this that had been promised to them.

[Dicevska] A plan for a long-range program for the development of the agrarian sector is being drafted. What new features will it include?

[Ancev] The formulation of such a long-term plan is neither easy nor simple. A contract to this effect has already been signed with the Skopje Economics Institute, and the project should deal with the development strategy for the period through the year 2010. However, in the formulation of such a plan the state cannot rely exclusively on its own machinery. On the contrary, all existing knowledge and practical experience, both domestic and global, must be applied.

Nonetheless, the main problem that is being dealt with is that of ownership in agriculture. In that sense, I personally believe that there must be comprehensive privatization in the growing of farm products and animal husbandry. It is true that in our country, to a certain extent, the ratios in farm ownership are satisfactory, particularly when we know that in plant production the ratio is 80:20 and in livestock breeding it is as high as 90:10 percent.

However, before we undertake the definitive implementation of the total privatization of property in agriculture, steps must be taken and efforts made to restructure property ownership in the private sector by consolidating the land. In short, we must make it possible in the private sector for a single family to operate like a factory. This also means more state investments in the rural infrastructure.

A New Protective System

[Dicevska] While the project is being drafted, what steps are being proposed for this year?

[Ancev] The first thing to do is to make changes in the old protective system. More specifically, we are contemplating protective measures for six commodities: wheat, sunflower, sugar beets, tobacco, lamb, and veal. We are also considering the inclusion of oleaginous turnips in this system, which will make it a maximum of seven commodities. We are considering for this year certain changes in the system of bonuses and other incentives. The main reason for this is that the way such steps have been applied so far proved to be less than efficient. That was why the state still owes money to producers, having failed to meet its commitments for bonuses, discounts, and so on. The total debt owed for last year alone is 4.5 billion denars, two billion denars of these on the unpaid differential between the protected and the purchase prices of 120 denars per kg of sunflower. However, we must not allow ourselves to set extremely high protective prices such as to make purchases difficult and, therefore, difficult to sell the goods on the domestic and foreign markets.

[Dicevska] How have the farmers reacted to such announced changes this year?

[Ancev] There has been a reaction. However, it is better for such reaction to occur at the beginning than later, when the eventual price increases will bring to the surface major problems related to finding the necessary funds and the impossibility on the part of the state to purchase the harvest, as guaranteed. However, joint efforts will be made to test market opportunities for exporting as much as possible. This will also solve the current problems caused by the great surpluses of some goods. Currently, we do not know where to sell about 30,000 metric tons of apples. It is precisely for such reasons that we asked the Ministry of Relations With Foreign Countries to impose a total ban on importing tropical fruits except on the basis of a compensatory deal involving apples.

[Dicevska] We are on the eve of the spring sowing campaign. What is the financial situation related to this campaign?

[Ancev] The official preparations for the forthcoming farming activities start on the 14th of this month or, more specifically, on St. Tripun's Day. This applies above all to the spring sowing. The program for this has already been drafted and calls for putting some 220,000

hectares under spring wheat, sunflower, tobacco, beets, and garden and fodder crops. Such production activities will be financed with funds from the selective program. However, we cannot as yet determine their precise amount, for the final approval must come from the Macedonian Assembly. In any case, we expect to have good weather conditions, helped by this winter's snow. This also indicates an availability of more than 5 billion cubic meters of water. For the time being, there seems to be no problems with the necessary petroleum for the machinery for the next three months.

[Dicevska] What privileges will be granted to the sowers in the forthcoming sowing campaign?

[Ancev] There will be discounts for seeds amounting to 30 percent, and for protective means and fertilizers, 15 percent. However, this has not been definitively approved, for we are still considering higher discounts for seeds, which is a prerequisite for high output. The purpose will be to eliminate the increased use of commercially purchased seeds, due to the higher price of high-grade seeding materials.

[Dicevska] The involvement of science in the implementation of these three anticipated steps should not be neglected. What is being anticipated in the area of cooperation on this level?

[Ancev] In no other area has a scientific network become as developed as it is in agriculture. Firm results have been achieved, particularly in the development of new strains and other basic production innovations. We are emphasizing the need for greater cooperation with all scientific institutes and other institutions. It is in this context that we are thinking of an overall reorganization of the services for the advancement of private farming or, more specifically, of meeting not only the needs of the private farmers but also ensuring that their work includes cooperation with the entire agricultural complex, particularly in the application of scientific achievements. This means cooperation with the scientific institutions. Briefly, these services must provide systematic services to farming, as is the case elsewhere in the world.

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DATE FILMED

15 APRIL 1993